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Pluralism, Parental Preference, and
Child Custody
Elizabeth S. Scottt
Modern child custody law faces an importantchallenge in responding
to pluralistic and evolving gender and parenting roles. Professor Scott
finds rulesfavoring maternal custody,joint custody, and the best interests
of the child wanting; she argues that the optimal response to the current
pluralism in family structure isa rule that seeks to replicatepastparental
roles. This "approximation" standardpromotes continuity and stability
for children. It encourages cooperative ratherthan conflictual resolution
of custody, thereby ameliorating the destructive effects of bargainingat
divorce. It also recognizes and reinforces role change in individualfamilies, encouraging both parents to invest in parenting before and after
divorce. Although an approximationapproach might disappointthose who
believe that custody law can serve as a transformationaltool of social
reform, Professor Scott argues that mandating conformity to prescribed
family roles is costly and ultimately ineffective. Herproposedframework
allowsfamilies to function accordingto their individualvalues andpreferences while subtly encouraging the restructuringof parentalroles in the
direction of desirable reform.
The tone of most commentary on law regulating child custody disputes on divorce reflects either frustration or resignation.1 Feminists
argue that the interests of women have been subverted as the legal preference for mothers has weakened. 2 Fathers' rights groups advocate laws
t University Professor, University of Virginia. B.A. 1967, College of William and Mary;
J.D. 1977, University of Virginia. For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article, I thank my
colleagues Ken Abraham, Ian Ayres, Katharine Bartlett, Bob Emery, John Jeffries, Pam Karlan,
Jody Kraus, John Monahan, Bill Stuntz, Michael Wald, Larry Walker, and participants in a faculty
workshop at the University of Florida Law School. Susan Ricks provided excellent research
assistance. Bob Scott cheerfully read several drafts and provided invaluable substantive feedback,
editorial suggestions, and moral support.
1. At least one scholar has seriously advocated flipping a coin to determine custody. See Jon
Elster, Solomonic Judgment" Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 40-43
(1987).
2. See, eg., PHYLLIS CHESLER, MOTHnRS ON TRIAL (1986) (arguing that child custody law
is patriarchal); Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, ProfessionalLanguage, and Legal Change in
Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727, 765-68 (1988) (arguing that the rhetoric of
mediation with its focus on fathers' rights can be damaging to mothers); Nancy D. Polikoff, Gender
and Child-Custody Determinations: Exploding the Myths, in FAMILIES, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 183, 187-92 (Irene Diamond ed., 1983) (in some instances judges view fathers as more
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favoring joint custody, protesting that under traditional rules divorced
fathers are "disenfranchised" as parents.3 In the current climate of family change, many observers have concluded that no available custody rule

is particularly satisfactory and that the best we can do is muddle along
with the much criticized best interests of the child standard.

One way to think about custody decision rules, and the custody
decisions themselves, is in terms of what they express about the roles of
parents in relation to their children. In these terms, a maternal preference rule recognizes and reinforces the traditional role of mothers as the
primary caretakers of their children. A rule favoring joint custody, on
the other hand, seeks to impose more egalitarian family roles, with parents sharing the care of the child.' Finally, the best interests of the child
standard, on its face, masks the importance of the parents' roles in caring
for the child during the marriage-anything a judge finds important to
the child's welfare may decide custody, from parental religious practices
to lifestyle preferences.'
appropriate authority figures and hold women, especially those who work, to stricter standards);
Carol Smart, Power and the Politics of Child Custody, in CHILD CUSTODY AND THE POLITICS OF
GENDER I (Carol Smart & Selma Sevenhuijsen eds., 1989) (exploring power dynamics in familial
relationships and its effect on the granting of custody); Rena K. Uviller, Fathers' Rights and
Feminism The Maternal Presumption Revisited, I HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 107 (1978) (positing that
giving fathers an equal footing in custody disputes might put mothers at a disadvantage).
3. For an early influential work that expresses fathers' frustrations about traditional custody
arrangements, see MEL ROMAN & WILLIAM HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT: THE CASE FOR
JOINT CUSTODY (1978). Fathers' rights groups were extremely influential in lobbying for stronger
joint custody laws. See Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST.
L.J. 455, 462 (1984).
4. Cf David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rulesfor Custody Disputes in Divorce,
83 MICH. L. Rnv. 477, 564 (1984) (in custody cases involving children up to the age of five, child
development research supports at most a weak preference in favor of primary caretakers, but in cases
involving older children there is no support for a rule different from the best interests standard);
Robert H. Mnookin, Child-CustodyAdjudication: JudicialFunctions in the Face of Indeterminacy,
39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 282 (1975) (concluding that all available alternatives have more
disadvantages than the indeterminate best interests standard).
5. Parents can share joint legal custody, joint physical custody, or both. Joint legal custody
gives both parents authority over important decisions affecting the child's life, such as educational
and medical decisions. In a joint physical custody arrangement, the child spends a significant
amount of time in each parent's home. Some joint custody statutes are unclear about which is
contemplated, see Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 3, at 455 n.1, although the concept of joint custody
would seem to involve the child's spending a substantial portion of time with each parent, id. (citing
H. Jay Folberg & Marva Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 523, 529 (1979)).
6. Many statutory provisions defining the best interests of the child list a number of criteria
that courts may consider in determining the child's custody. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25332 (Supp. 1990); COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-124(1.5) (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a)(5)
(1989); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21(a) (West Supp. 1990); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752(5) (West Supp. 1990); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(3) (West
Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1) (West Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(1)
(1989); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(5) (West Supp. 1990). Although some criteria relate to the
child's prior care, many do not. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(3)(f), (g), (i) (West
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The current debate about custody is in large measure a conflict
about the extent to which the custody decision should rest on the parents' participation in rearing their child during marriage. During an era
in which parenting roles are in flux, families vary in the allocation of
child care responsibilities. In response to this pluralism, the dominant
best interests standard for deciding custody presumes that past patterns
of care are inadequate as a guide to future custody. In different ways,
both joint custody advocates and proponents of a primary caretaker preference object to the best interests standard because it obscures the importance of past parental involvement. Only a legal preference for the
primary caretaker assures that the parent who has been principally
responsible for rearing the child during the marriage will be her custodian after divorce. Only a joint custody rule assures that two parents
who have fully shared in the care of their child will continue to do so
after divorce. Both of these challenges contain a measure of truth. Each
in its own way, however, also distorts past parental roles. A primary
caretaker preference discounts the role of the "secondary" parent, while
a joint custody rule accurately describes parental role allocation only
when both parents fully participated in child care during marriage.
In this Article, I argue that the inquiry regarding future custody
arrangements should focus on the past relationship of each parent to the
child and do so in a more precise and individualized way than either the
best interests standard or the reform alternatives require. The custody
decision is an announcement and prescription of the future part each
parent will play in the child's life over the years of her minority. There
is, I argue, no sounder basis for this prescription than past relationships.
Therefore, in most cases the law's goal should be to approximate, to the
extent possible, the predivorce role of each parent in the child's life.
Because it is most likely to reflect the real preferences of each parent, and
also to predict actual caretaking arrangements, an "approximation" rule
serves the law's traditional objectives of promoting continuity and stability for the child more effectively than do existing rules. Moreover, again
because it is more likely to reflect parents' actual preferences than other
custody frameworks, an approximation rule can reduce the heavy costs
of bargaining over custody by reducing the incentive to exchange entitlements. This approach to drafting a blueprint for future family arrangements presumes that each parent will continue the relationship with the
child developed before divorce; thus some of the adversarial character of
the dispute will dissipate. Although courts and parties will continue to
allocate the resources of parental authority over, and time with, the
Supp. 1991) (listing the moral fitness of the parties, their mental and physical health, and the
preference of the child as factors that a court may consider). For a discussion of the best interests
standard, see infra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
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child, the outcome becomes less like a prize to be won in a zero-sum
game.
The approximation approach also responds to a dilemma that has
troubled feminists. Most feminists agree that women have been disadvantaged by traditional marital roles and that some convergence of family roles is necessary if women are to emerge from their subordinated
status.' Some feminists assert that custody law can best serve women's
interests by strongly supporting mothers' custody claims.' Others,
emphasizing the symbolic and expressive function of the law, argue that
a preference favoring joint custody will encourage desirable change in the
ideology of gender roles.9 In my view, neither view is wholly satisfactory. A custody rule that favors mothers offers women an immediate
benefit, but reinforces stereotypical gender roles to women's long-term
detriment. A joint custody rule, on the other hand, offers fathers an
obvious advantage over mothers in the short term. Moreover, efforts to
reform gender roles by attempting to reorder family relationships
through custody law are likely to be costly and disappointing. An
approximation framework offers a more modest but more effective
endorsement of the goal of egalitarian gender roles. It recognizes and
supports change that has occurred in individual families and encourages
parents to invest in both family and work with some assurance that the
investment will not be lost.
In Part I of the Article, I tell the story of modem child custody law
as a debate about the correct legal response to pluralistic and evolving
gender and parenting roles. I analyze the diluted importance of parental
participation under the best interests standard and evaluate the challenge
of reform alternatives favoring either the primary caretaker or joint
custody.
In Part II, I introduce the approximation standard and argue that,
purely in terms of the conventional objectives of custody law, a rule that
seeks to replicate past parental roles provides the optimal framework
with which to promote continuity and stability for children. Moreover,
an approximation approach symbolically reformulates custody discourse
7.

Early feminist support of the gender-neutral standard focused on the disadvantage to

women of their traditional roles in marriage. See

LENORE J. WErrZMAN, THE MARRIAGE

CONTRACT: SPousEs, LOVERS, AND THE LAW 100-20 (1981).

8. See sources cited supra note 2. This position derives in part from a perception that women
have been disadvantaged under the gender-neutral standard. Beyond this, many feminists today
emphasize the qualities that make women unique, none of which, of course, is more important than
motherhood. For a discussion of "difference" feminism, see infra notes 36-38 and accompanying
text.
9. See, eg., Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the
Dependency Dilemma, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 41 (1986) (asserting that a reformed joint
custody rule could contribute to a beneficial "transformation of both male and female values").
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in a way that is more protective of future family relationships than are
existing alternatives.
In Part III, I evaluate the various custody decision rules in terms of
the social costs of resolving custody disputes. An important measure of
the merits of a custody decision rule is its effectiveness in containing the
onerous costs of bargaining over custody. Because it is more likely to
reflect the actual preferences of both parties, the approximation approach
encourages cooperative rather than conflictual resolution of custody and
thereby ameliorates the destructive effects of bargaining.
In Part IV, I join the debate about the impact of various custody
decision rules on the ideology of gender roles. Although promoting egalitarian parental roles is a legitimate policy goal, I challenge those who
advocate joint custody as an expression of commitment to this goal.
Because an approximation rule tailors custody arrangements to each parent's role, it represents the optimal response to the current pluralism in
family structure. The approach reinforces role change in individual families and encourages both parents to invest in parenting, but also recognizes the modest capacity of the law directly to influence gender norms
and to regulate ongoing family relationships.
I
A PARENTAL ROLES PERSPECTIVE ON CHILD CUSTODY
LAW

Recently, the law has struggled to establish a foundation for deciding divorce custody cases without the blueprint previously provided by
sharply differentiated gender roles. In a period in which gender norms
are changing and there is no consensus concerning parental functioning,
the importance of prior parental roles in the custody decision has become
uncertain. In this Part, I examine modern custody law from the perspective of what different rules express about the roles of parents in the intact
family. This lens clarifies that, in different ways, each of the modern
custody decision frameworks-the dominant best interests of the child
standard, a rule favoring joint custody, and a preference for the primary
caretaker-diminishes the importance of the past roles of the parents.
A.

The Erosion of the MaternalPreference and
Dilution of ParentalRoles

Until the 1970s, a bright-line rule favoring mothers in custody disputes acknowledged the gendered character of parenting, and in most
cases directed that the future roles of parents in the child's life should be
based on the past.10 Under the tender years presumption, mothers were
10. This bright-line rule, by preferring the mother as the custodian of young children, of course
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awarded custody of their children because they had cared for them, and
thus were presumed more competent to meet their needs than were
fathers. 1 ' The decline of the maternal preference rule and the current
uncertainty about the correct basis for custody reflect, in part, an evolution in gender and parenting roles. As more mothers entered the work
force and more fathers assumed greater involvement with their children,
a rule based on gender-role differentiation seemed less viable.' 2
Although feminists later came to distrust the best interests standard, they
initially supported the innovation because the tender years presumption
seemed to reinforce stereotyped gender norms.' 3 Moreover, as the blurring of sharply divided family roles weakened the rationale for the tender
years presumption, the rule became vulnerable to equal protection
challenges. 14
failed to acknowledge adequately the role some fathers played within their families. California led
the way in abandoning a maternal preference, moving in 1972 to a gender-neutral standard. See Act
of Aug. 17, 1972, ch. 1007 see. 1, 1972 Cal. Stat. 1855, 1855 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a))
(deleting provision that "other things being equal, custody should be given to the mother if the child
is of tender years").
11. See, eg., Sheehan v. Sheehan, 143 A.2d 874, 882 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958) (the
tender years presumption is based on the theory that mothers "will take better and more expert care
of [the] child than the father"). One basis for this expertise would seem to be mothers' past
experience.
12. This decrease in viability results in part because courts no longer assume that mothers are
in all cases the primary caretakers. See cases cited infra note 14. Some courts have been quite
explicit about dropping this assumption. For example, the court in Forsyth v. Forsyth, 172 N.W.2d
Ill (Iowa 1969), stated that:
the [maternal preference] is based at least partly on the assumption that the mother keeps
the home, performs the household duties and will have more time to devote to the children
and their welfare. Where, as here, both the mother and the father work . . . and the
evidence shows the husband performed a large share of the household duties ordinarily
performed by a mother... [and] spent much free time with the children ... the evidence
discloses that [the maternal preference] inference would not be proper.
Id at 114.
13. Feminists in the 1960s and 1970s argued that the traditional maternal role prevented
women from competing with men in employment and other spheres. The gender-neutral standard
was a way of breaking down stereotypes that confined women to subordinated domestic roles.
Following this line of thought, custody was often characterized as a burden that fathers as well as
mothers should assume. See, eg., JUNE NOBLE & WILLIAM NOBLE, THE CUSTODY TRAP (1975);
see also WErrZMAN, supra note 7, at 99-102 (1981) (describing the historical development of the
legal assumption that women should bear full-time responsibility for child care and arguing that the
change in the status of women in the labor force necessitates a change in the assumption).
14. In State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 290-91 (Fam. Ct. 1973), the court struck
down New York's maternal preference law as a violation of fathers' equal protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. After classifying the law as practicing sex discrimination, the court
analyzed it under a standard of strict scrutiny. See id. at 290-91. Although the United States
Supreme Court later implicitly found strict scrutiny to be unduly rigorous in sex discrimination
cases, see, eg., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (applying an intermediate standard of
review under which gender classifications must serve important governmental objectives and be
substantially related to the achievement of these objectives), other courts have followed Watts in
striking down the maternal preference on equal protection grounds. See Devine v. Devine, 398 So.
2d 686 (Ala. 198 1) (holding that a rule dictating maternal custody absent a showing of the mother's
unfitness violates the Fourteenth Amendment); King v. Vancil, 341 N.E.2d 65 (Il1. App. Ct. 1975)
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Under the best interests standard, the inquiry has become broader
and more discretionary. The best interests standard does not reject past
parental care of the child as a basis for custody. Indeed, typical statutory
provisions at least implicitly encourage courts to consider past parental
participation.15 Moreover, evidence that courts continue to favor
mothers in custody disputes16 suggests that the predivorce caretaking
function is valued. Nonetheless, the importance of the parental role during marriage has become diluted under the best interests standard. Modem formulations of the criteria for awarding custody describe a broad
range of factors,1 7 and empirical studies reveal that courts give central
importance to parents' moral character, mental stability, and ability to
provide a stable community environment," factors that previously would
have been important primarily in cases in which maternal unfitness was
alleged. The best interests standard is facially neutral about the weight
(holding that the maternal preference absent a showing of the mother's unfitness violates the Illinois
equal rights amendment); see also WALTER WADLINGTON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 195-98 (successor ed. 1984). In a related area, the United States Supreme
Court struck down, on equal protection grounds, an Alabama statute that permitted awards of
alimony upon divorce only to wives. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). The Court noted that the
statutory classification distributing benefits and burdens by gender carried "the inherent risk of
reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special protection." Id.
at 283.
15. See, eg., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402(3), 9A U.L.A. 561 (1968) (describing
as one factor for the court to consider in deciding custody "the interaction and interrelationship of
the child with his parent or parents"). The Michigan custody statute lists factors for court
consideration which are likely to focus the court's attention on the caretaking role of the parents.
See MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(a) (West Supp. 1991) ("[t]he love, affection, and other
emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child"); id. § 722.23(d) ("[tlhe length of
time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment"); id. § 722.23(e) ("It]he permanence,
as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home").
16. See infra note 20.
17. Virginia, for example, directs its courts to consider the age and mental and physical
condition of the child and parent, the relationship between each parent and the child, the needs of
the child, the role that each parent has played and will play in the future in the upbringing and care
of the child, and such other factors as are necessary to decide the best interests of the child. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-107.2.1 (Michie Supp. 1990).
Courts, as well as legislatures, emphasize a wide range of factors in deciding custody. See In re
Marriage of Short, 698 P.2d 1310 (Colo.1985) (parent's religious beliefs and practices as a Jehovah's
Witness may be considered if such beliefs and practices are reasonably likely to harm the child);
Moye v. Moye, 627 P.2d 799 (Idaho 1981) (the physical condition of a parent is a valid
consideration); Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1979) (a change of custody is justified based on
possible harm to child from mother's living with but not intending to marry an individual of the
opposite sex), cert denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980); Salk v. Salk, 393 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1975)
(father's superior financial status is a legitimate consideration), aff'd, 385 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (App. Div.
1976); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981) (mother's cohabitation with her lesbian
lover justifies the finding that children's best interests are served by father's custody).
18. Two studies of factors considered by judges in making custody decisions support the
finding that prior care of the child is often not the central consideration in decisionmaking. See
Charles P. Barnard & Gust Jensen, Wisconsin Judges and Child Custody Criteria, CONCILIATION
CTs. REV., Dec. 1985, at 69, 69-70; Carol R. Lowery, The Wisdom of Solomon: Criteriafor Child
Custodyfrom the Legal and Clinical Points of View, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 371, 374-77 (1984).
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that should be attached to parents' past roles relative to other factors,
permitting decisions about custody to be based on whatever aspects of
the character, capability, and experience of the parents seem relevant to
the court.
The well-documented deficiencies of the best interests standard as a
decision rule19 are attributable in part to its attenuating the link between
custody and past parental care. The wide-open inquiry that the standard
invites often devolves into a destructive contest in which each parent
competes to expose the flaws of the other. The eventual determination
can be speculative and value-laden, as the standard encourages courts to
assess the character of the contestants and the potential capacity of each
to assume the child's future care. Moreover, because under the standard
courts receive no guidance about how to weigh past performance, inconsistency and imprecision result even among courts that value the past
parental caretaking role. Some courts continue to strongly favor mothers
for custody, basing decisions on traditional stereotypes rather than on
actual parental roles,2' while others have responded to superficial change
in gender roles by assuming that if mothers work, then both parents must
have participated equally in child care responsibility.2"
The diminished importance attached to the parental caretaking
function under the best interests standard is something of a puzzle.
Although the deeply entrenched gender norms that gave shape to the
tender years presumption no longer support a maternal preference, it
does not follow that the function of caring for the child has become less
19. See Mnookin, supra note 4, at 226-28.
20. Although the subject is somewhat controversial, research indicates that mothers continue
to be favored for custody under the gender-neutral standard. See Jessica Pearson & Maria A.L.
Ring, JudicialDecision-Makingin Contested Custody Cases, 21 J. FAM. L. 703 (1982-83). Pearson
and Ring studied judicial decisionmaking by Colorado judges and found that mothers were awarded
custody in a large majority of cases. Fathers rarely won unless there was a question of the mothers'
fitness. Id. at 716. Pearson and Ring concluded that older judges in particular were still very much
influenced by the tender years presumption. Id. at 719; see also Lenore J. Weitzman & Ruth B.
Dixon, Child Custody Award" Legal Standards and EmpiricalPatternsfor Child Custody, Support
and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 473, 502-05 (1979) (study of Los Angeles
County physical custody awards concluding that as of 1977 there was "continued strength of the
preference for the mother as the custodian of children after divorce," id. at 504 (emphasis omitted)).
21. Some courts have concluded that a maternal preference is justified only if the mother was a
"full-time" caretaker. See, eg., In re Marriage of Estelle, 592 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979)
("If both parents are employed and equally absent from the home, the mother has no more part in
training, nurturing, and helping in the child's development; and, if everything else is equal, the
mother has no better claim to child custody."); see also Patton v. Armstrong, 307 N.E.2d 178 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1974) (tender years doctrine not applicable where the mother worked during the day and
expected to continue to do so). Courts also noted that fathers are capable of taking care of children,
thus challenging the notion that mothers have special competency. See, e.g., Bah v. Bah, 668 S.W.2d
663, 666 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that fathers can provide for children's needs as well as
mothers). For a discussion of the expanding psychological literature on the role of fathers, see infra
notes 144-61, 171-72 and accompanying text.

1992]

CHILD CUSTODY

important as a basis for custody. What, then, explains the erosion of the
connection between custody and past care?
One explanation might be that the trend toward less sharply differentiated parenting roles makes past care less useful as a basis for choosing one parent over another. Each parent offers enough evidence of
participation in the child's life to weaken any exclusive claim made on
that basis. Thus, a rule of thumb that awards sole custody to the parent
who gave "more care" can seem unfair to the parent who provided

"some care." Moreover, as roles become less distinct, the task of deter-

mining the primary caretaker becomes more difficult, reducing its value
as a rule of thumb.
Another interpretation emerges when this issue is placed in the
broader context of change in family law. Influenced by principles of liberal individualism, the legal conception of the family has evolved from
one of a hierarchical, feudal community to one of a loose association of
rights-bearing individuals.2 2 In this framework, custody discourse is
egalitarian and custody rights are valuable entitlements; thus, it seems
important that both parents have an equal opportunity to establish their
claim.23 Fathers, even in contemporary society, are likely to be disadvantaged if parental care during marriage is the focal inquiry. Thus, the
argument goes, if custody is to be awarded to only one parent, then
fathers' legal claims are meaningful only if other variables are given
weight, and the decision measures each parent's capacities and resources
without "undue" emphasis on past roles.2 4
22. See

MICHAEL GROSSBERG,

NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA

GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN

(1985) (describing the legal status of the colonial family as

hierarchical and patriarchal).
23. Given the inferior legal status held by women until only recently, it is implausible that
custody rights were viewed as entitlements to women under the tender years presumption. Indeed,
the presumption did not establish a legal right for mothers to the custody of their young children but
was rather an evidentiary presumption to be used in deciding what was in the best interests of the
child. See Ramsay L. Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrin" A Defense, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 341-42
(1982); see also Anonymous, 55 Ala. 428, 432-33 (1876) (describing the "calamity" of an infant
daughter's being deprived of her mother's care). For a response to this argument, see infra notes 4750 and accompanying text.
24. See Porter v. Porter, 274 N.W.2d 235 (N.D. 1979). The court in Porterupheld the award
of custody to the father, partly on the ground that he was in a better position to lend stability and
guidance to the children because of his present employment. The court rejected the mother's
argument that her earning capabilities were reduced because she stayed home and took care of the
children, and therefore should not be a factor in depriving her of custody. The court suggested that
it would be unfair to the father to deprive him of custody because he did not remain home to care for
the children but rather developed his career to support the family. Id at 241-42.
A common objection to a primary caretaker preference rule is that, compared to the best
interests standard, it disadvantages fathers and favors mothers. Supporters of the rule implicitly
acknowledge this effect. Chief Justice Richard Neely of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia argued that the maternal preference protects the interest of mothers in divorce from the
disadvantage that would otherwise result because of mothers' unequal bargaining positions under a
gender-neutral standard. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981); see also Richard
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Joint Custody: An AspirationalNorm

The best interests standard was unsatisfactory to some because it
failed to accomplish the goal of making custody equally available to

fathers. In the 1980s, fathers' custody rights became the focus of organized interest groups, which successfully lobbied state legislatures to enact
statutes favoring joint custody.2" Proponents of joint custody accused
courts of clinging to stereotyped gender norms and continuing to favor
mothers for custody, even in the face of the formally gender-neutral best
interests rule.
The policy arguments offered by advocates of joint custody can be
translated into certain positive and normative claims about the relationship between joint custody and patterns of parental care. Joint custody,
the argument goes, is superior in part because it more accurately replicates the roles of parents in intact families than does sole 'custody. As
gender role norms have evolved, fathers have become increasingly active
participants in their children's lives.2 6 The typical sole custody arrangement under the best interests standard relegates fathers to the status of
"visitors," sharply diminishing their parent-child contact and withdrawing their parental authority. Joint custody, in contrast, is based on a
model of shared parenting and thus, supporters assert, more accurately
reflects modern family roles. As such a model, the argument concludes,
it offers a blueprint for the divorced family that will be more satisfactory
to all family members.
There is some truth to this claim. Under traditional sole custody
arrangements, fathers are indeed relegated to more distant parental roles
Neely, The Primary CaretakerParentRule: Child Custody and the Dynamics ofGreed, 3 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 168, 171, 177-81 (1984) (arguing that gender-neutral custody rules expose women to
extortionate bargaining by their husbands).
25. For a discussion of the joint custody movement and the role of fathers' rights advocacy
groups, see Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 3; see also ROMAN & HADDAD, supra note 3 (advocacy of
joint custody by two fathers who were dissatisfied with their own custody arrangements).
26. Some scholars assert that because fathers are now more involved in the care of children,
maternal custody no longer provides greater continuity for the child than does paternal custody.
Thus, the least disruptive arrangement will often be joint custody, which better resembles the family
patterns before divorce. Folberg & Graham, supranote 5, at 533-37. Professor Holly Robinson has
argued that since the rights and responsibilities of parents during marriage are equal and exercised
jointly, the custody arrangement should reflect the same sharing of rights and responsibilities. See
Holly L. Robinson, Joint Custody: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 21 J. FAM. L. 641, 643-44
(1982-83). Sheila Schwartz has pointed to women's actual and desired incriased participation in the
workplace as a reason in favor of a presumption of joint custody. See Sheila F.G. Schwartz, Toward
a PresumptionofJoint Custody, 18 FAM. L.Q. 225, 236-37 (1984). For similar positions, see Joan B.
Kelly, Examining Resistance to Joint Custody, in JoINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 39, 3940 (Jay Folberg ed., 1984) (describing the reevaluation of divorce law and public policy regarding
custody following the entrance of large numbers of women into the work force and the redefinition
of parental and marital roles); David J. Miller, Joint Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345, 365 (1979) (arguing
that joint custody is justified by the increased number of women in the job market and by greater
involvement of men in "child rearing and nurturing responsibilities").
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than fathers have in most families, and paternal resentment of this status
is not surprising.2 7 Because it recognizes the legal authority of fathers as
well as mothers after divorce, joint legal custody both literally and symbolically reflects a widely shared norm about the relationship of fathers
to their children that is subverted in conventional placement under the

best interests standard.28
The positive argument favoring joint physical custody is, however,
less persuasive. To be sure, in some families both parents actively share
childrearing tasks, so that joint physical custody replicates accurately
their accustomed roles. Most mothers and fathers, however, are not coprimary parents, and thus the case for joint physical custody cannot be
made on the ground that this arrangement reflects the typical allocation

of parental roles in contemporary marriage. In fact, such a rule, generally applied, is no more accurate in replicating past parental roles than is
the best interests standard. The principal difference is that, in the typical

case, the past participation of mothers rather than fathers will be discounted if the law favors joint physical custody.
Of course, the argument for joint custody does not rest solely, or
even principally, on these positive grounds. Proponents rely heavily on

the normative claim that a rule favoring joint custody is superior because
it announces a societal commitment to promoting the sharing of parental
responsibilities. 29 Greater family participation by fathers will promote

egalitarian gender roles; it will also strengthen families and promote
children's welfare. 30 Adherents of this position presume, of course, that
27. Fathers often resent the typical postdivorce relationship with their children. Noncustodial
fathers-so-called "Disneyland Daddies"--are often relegated to the role of merely entertaining
their child rather than fulfilling ordinary parental functions. See E. Mavis Hetherington et al.,
Divorced Fathers; 25 FAM. COORDINATOR 417 (1976) (study of the disruption, coping, and
adjustment by fathers in the two years following divorce). For a discussion of the increased
participation of fathers in their children's lives, see infra notes 51-52, 145-49 and accompanying text.
28. In some states, the majority of divorced parents have joint legal custody. See Catherine R.
Albiston et al., Does Joint Legal CustodyMatter?, 2 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 167, 167 (1990) (study
reporting that in California nearly 80% of divorced parents have joint legal custody of their
children). The symbolic importance of joint legal custody in recognizing the father as the child's
parent is at least as important as the legal authority conferred and might explain its popularity.
Researchers have found that fathers with joint legal custody did not participate more than those in
sole legal custody arrangements in making decisions about their children. Id.
29. Indeed, many custody statutes are prefaced by policy statements expressing such a
legislative commitment. California Civil Code section 4600(a), for example, states:
The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state to assure minor
children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have
separated or dissolved their marriage, and to encourage parents to share the rights and
responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy, except where that contact
would not be in the best interest of the child ....
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a) (West Supp. 1991).
30. The most articulate argument for joint custody as an expression of commitment to
egalitarian gender roles is offered by Katharine Bartlett and Carol Stack. See Bartlett & Stack, supra
note 9. They argue that a joint custody preference is an expression through the law of society's
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even parents who divided responsibilities in a conventional way during
marriage will adapt to joint custody with resulting benefits to the
postdivorce family. Recent empirical evidence suggests, however, that
this reform in custody law has failed to transform family roles as
promised.3 1
C. A Feminist Response: The Primary CaretakerPreference
Feminists increasingly express dismay that contemporary custody
law dilutes the importance attached to the primary caretaking role of
mothers.3 2 Although the risk that mothers face of losing a custody dispute is greater under the best interests standard than under the tender
years presumption, in practice, courts applying the best interests standard continue to favor mothers for custody. 33 The formally gender-neutral rule generates uncertainty, however, by sending misleading signals to
both men and women about fathers' prospects for custody. This uncertainty can lead women, who care more about having custody than do
men, to insure custody by trading away claims for support and property. 34 Many feminists, although they endorse the ideal of shared parentcommitment to a gender role ideology that will reduce women's dependency. Joint custody, they
argue, reinforces values of autonomy and independence for women and releases them from the
dependency that is associated with the primary caretaker role. Even in families in which fathers
have not shared in parenting responsibility during marriage, joint custody expresses the law's
commitment to shared responsibility. Id. at 33. On a more concrete level, other supporters ofjoint
custody argue that it will promote the sharing of parental responsibility, increase the involvement of
fathers with their children, and ameliorate the problem of fathers withdrawing from their
relationship with their children after divorce. For a discussion of this position, see Scott & Derdeyn,
supra note 3, at 458-62. Some enthusiasts for joint custody emphasize the benefits for children of
fathers' greater involvement in their children's lives. Dr. Lee Salk has commented that "'a Uoint]
custody arrangement provides some children with more attention than they ever got when their
parents were living together.'" Miller, supra note 26, at 363 (quoting LEE SALK, WHAT EVERY
CHILD WOULD LIKE His PARENTS TO KNOW 89 (1972)).
31. This empirical research will be examined infra at notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
32. Some critics argue that the gender-neutral best interests standard, in seeking to avoid
gender bias, discounts the importance of the primary caretaker function and characteristics of
nurturing. See Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal
Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 107, 121. Others have
objected to the glorification of fatherhood inherent in the standard. See, e.g., Smart, supra note 2, at
8-21; see also Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A BriefAnalysis of Criteria Used in Child
Custody Determinations, WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP., Spring 1982, at 235 (criticizing the importance
judges grant to factors such as the remarriage of the father, the father's financial resources, and the
mother's "excess" employment commitment (which is often quite similar to the father's)).
33. Some feminist critics argue that the reason women are more frequently awarded custody is
because men do not want it, yet when men do seek custody they are often successful. See, e.g.,
CHESLER, supra note 2, at 66-94 (reporting that 70% of women lost custody when challenged by
fathers); Polikoff, supra note 32, at 236 (presenting the results of Los Angeles and Minneapolis
studies that indicate fathers who requested custody were granted custody 63% and 45% of the time
respectively). Most outcome studies of custody adjudication suggest, however, that women usually
win custody adjudications. See Pearson & Ring, supra note 20, at 715; Weitzman & Dixon, supra
note 20, at 488-91.
34. See Neely, supra note 24, at 171, 177-81. There is substantial evidence that women
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ing as an important component of gender equality, also have rejected the
viability of joint custody. Mothers in many families invest more heavily
in childrearing than do fathers. Thus, joint custody confers "windfall"
parental rights on fathers, requiring dissatisfied mothers to make financial concessions to obtain acceptable custody arrangements.3"
Recent emphasis in feminist jurisprudence on women's unique experience and identity has reinforced support of maternal custody rights.3 6
Drawing on the work of psychologist Carol Gilligan and others, feminists of difference argue that women are deeply different from men in
their values and priorities and that feminine values such as nurturing,
connectedness, and emotionality have been discounted in traditional libgenerally desire custody more than do men. See Robert H. Mnookin et al., Private Ordering
Revisited: What CustodialArrangements Are Parents Negotiating?, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE
CROSSROADS 37, 46-49 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990). Professor David
Chambers has argued that one legitimate dimension of the primary caretaker's claim is that she cares
more about getting custody than the secondary caretaker and that the loss will be more painful. See
Chambers, supra note 4, at 541-48. For a discussion of the effect of this preference on bargaining,
see infra note 35 and accompanying text.
35. See Neely, supra note 24, at 171, 177-81; see also Smart, supra note 2, at 19-26 (arguing
that the joint custody movement is about power politics). Bartlett and Stack, although they
advocate joint custody as an expression of a desirable ideology, acknowledge the quid pro quo
argument made by other feminists. Women do not yet enjoy equal status in the workplace but,
under a joint custody preference, fathers obtain custody rights that equal those of mothers. See
Bartlett & Stack, supra note 9, at 13. Furthermore, a joint custody preference can actually force
women who believe the child's best interests will be served by stability and continuity, rather than by
the shuttling between parents that joint custody requires, to surrender rights and entitlements in
order to prevent the other parent from seeking joint custody. This is a problem especially in states
with a statutory provision that favors the parent who is more likely to allow frequent and continuing
contact between the child and the other parent (a so-called "friendly parent" provision). When only
one parent petitions for joint custody, a court might, pursuant to the friendly parent provision, favor
the petitioning parent, even when considering an award of sole custody. See Joanne Schulman &
Valerie Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child Custody:Analysis ofLegislationand Its Implicationsfor
Women and Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 538, 550-55 (1982). Further, Professors Scott
and Derdeyn argue that a joint custody preference diminishes the overall bargaining position of
divorcing women; such women, they argue, might reluctantly agree to joint custody or make
financial concessions in order to avoid it. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 3, at 477-81. The
disadvantage is especially pronounced in families in which spousal or child abuse has occurred. See
Schulman & Pitt, supra, at 555.
36. Modem feminists are divided between those who embrace formal gender equality"sameness" feminists-and those who support gender-based treatment favoring women on some
issues because of women's unique characteristics, needs, and experience---"difference" feminists.
This debate has received substantial scholarly attention. See Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing
Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1279, 1291-1301 (1987); Robin West, Jurisprudence and
Gender, 55 U. CHl. L. REv. 1, 4-58 (1988); Joan C. Williams, DeconstructingGender, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 797, 798 & n.2 (1989). Mid-twentieth-century feminists committed to gender equality in an
effort to combat the discrimination that women suffered based on gender stereotyping. Professor
Joan Williams has described this feminist position as "assimilationist," its goal being the
indistiguishable legal treatment of men and women. See id. at 798-99. Sameness feminists,
according to Williams, have realized that "the assimilationists' traditional focus on gender-neutrality
may have rendered women more vulnerable to certain gender-related disabilities that have important
economic consequences." Id. In addition, these feminists have been confronted by the existence of
relevant gender differences. Id. at 799.
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eral ideology.3 7 To some feminists, the maternal function represents the
ultimate expression of feminine values and identity and as such deserves
the highest regard and affirmation.3"
Several feminist scholars have argued for a primary caretaker preference, a rule that is formally gender-neutral but in fact favors mothers.39
Courts applying a primary caretaker rule award custody to the parent
who has had a larger role in rearing the child; the usual effect is to protect the mother-child relationship and recognize the mother's greater
commitment to childrearing. 4°

A primary caretaker preference focuses on parental participation in
37. The work of Carol Gilligan has been a dominant influence on the development of the
difference feminist perspective in jurisprudence. Gilligan challenges the view, which is based on
Lawrence Kohlberg's moral development theory, that women typically do not reach the highest
stages of moral development. Although her research suggests that the responses of girls and boys to
moral dilemmas are indeed different, Gilligan points out that the structure of moral values by which
Kohlberg evaluated moral development is intrinsically male, emphasizing abstraction and
autonomy. Gilligan asserts that feminine morality, in contrast, is expressed through responsibility
and concern for relationships. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
38. Several feminist scholars have focused on the powerful influence of the mothering role in
shaping women's identity. Robin West, for example, argues that women are instinctively more
"connected" to others by virtue of the fact that they bear children and are the caretakers of children:
Women's moral voice is one of responsibility, duty and care for others because women's
material circumstance is one of responsibility, duty and care for those who are first
physically attached, then physically dependent, and then emotionally interdependent.
Women think in terms of the needs of others rather than the rights of others because
women materially, and then physically, and then psychically, provide for the needs of
others.
West, supra note 36, at 21.
39. The primary caretaker preference awards custody to the parent who has performed the
basic care for the child. In Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981), the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals provided a list of "certain obvious criteria" to which a court should look
in determining which parent was the primary caretaker:
(1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and dressing; (3) purchasing,
cleaning, and care of clothes; (4) medical care, including nursing and trips to physicians;
(5) arranging for social interaction among peers after school, i.e. transporting to friends'
houses or, for example, to girl or boy scout meetings; (6) arranging alternative care, i.e.
babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the
middle of the night, waking child in the morning; (8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general
manners and toilet training; (9) educating, i.e. religious, cultural, social, etc.; and,
(10) teaching elementary skills, i.e., reading, writing and arithmetic.
Id. at 363. Martha Fineman describes the primary caretaker preference as a mechanism for
protecting the mother's interest in custody. Fineman argues that the legal system has turned
custody decisionmaking over to social worker mediators, who have shaped the discourse of custody
in a way that favors joint custody and casts mothers who do not want joint custody in a bad light.
See Fineman, supra note 2, at 766.
40. A few states have adopted this rule but, despite some academic support, its influence has
not been widespread. See Marcia O'Kelly, Blessing the Tie that Binds: Preferencefor the Primary
Caretakeras Custodian, 63 N.D. L. REv. 481, 508-33 (1987). Only Minnesota and West Virginia
adopted strong primary caretaker presumptions, and both did so by judicial opinion. See Pikula v.
Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 713 (Minn. 1985); Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 362. Minnesota subsequently
abandoned the presumption by statute, declaring that primary caretaking is only one of many factors
to be considered in resolving custody. See Act of May 22, 1989, ch. 248, § 2, 1989 Minn. Laws 834,
835-36 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1990)).
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the intact family as the basis for custody, and thus ameliorates the uncertainty generated by the best interests standard. By awarding custody to

the mother, this approach will replicate in the custody arrangement past
parental roles in traditional families. 4 1 Because one parent gets exclusive
custody, however, the role of the other parent will often be discounted.
This result can create potentially troublesome behavioral effects. The
rule discourages a "secondary" parent from investing in his relationship
with the child because a secondary relationship, however significant, will
not get much legal protection.42 On the other hand, the primary caretaker is encouraged by the rule to maintain her traditional domestic role.
Primary caretakers who share childrearing responsibilities (perhaps to
invest in careers) weaken their custody claim.43 Ironically, the primary
caretaker rule, which is generally advocated as a means to protect the
interests of women, tends to reinforce traditional gender and parenting
roles, an effect that is ultimately detrimental to women. Moreover, if the
trend is toward greater sharing of childrearing tasks, the preference will

become increasingly unhelpful in resolving custody disputes.'
In sum, there is considerable controversy about the extent to which

the law does or should require that the custody decision be based on
parental participation in the intact family. The best interests standard
permits courts to consider a broad range of factors, and thus dilutes the

importance to the decision of prior parental roles. Critics of the standard
have challenged it as systematically discounting the investment in child-

rearing of both mothers and fathers. Yet, both the advocates for joint
custody and those who favor a primary caretaker rule offer alternatives
that in different ways also distort prior roles. In part this is due to the
41. In families in which parents reverse traditional roles, of course, this approach will replicate
past roles in awarding custody to the father.
42. Alternatively, the secondary caretaker might compete for primary caretaker status, either
genuinely or strategically (that is, by seeking to assume primary care with plans of divorce in mind).
43. The utility of the primary caretaker preference in dual-career marriages has been
questioned. See, eg., Elster, supra note 1, at 37, 38. Courts often assume that if mothers work,
fathers share equally in the care of their children. See, eg., In re Marriage of Shepherd, 588 S.W.2d
174, 176 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). Nevertheless, some courts have applied the primary caretaker rule
despite the fact that both parents work. See, eg., Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 714 (stating that the court
"would expect that, as between any two parents, one will be the primary parent even if neither
conforms to the more traditional pattern of one parent working outside the home and one within
it").
44. Some critics have argued that the primary caretaker preference can prevent courts from
looking at special needs of children such as health care and education. See Gary Crippen, Stumbling
Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of
Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427
(1990). Proponents of joint custody challenge the primary caretaker preference on grounds that the
child needs contact with both parents. Some courts have criticized the preference as possibly
directing custody to an inadequate, but not unfit, primary caretaker. See, eg., Seymour v. Seymour,
433 A.2d 1005, 1008 (Conn. 1980) (stating that "a court has an independent responsibility to assure
itself of the suitability of the parent to whom the child is primarily attached").
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diversity among contemporary families-any generally applied allocation
will fail to approximate predivorce patterns of care for many families. If,
as I will argue, past roles are the best guide for shaping future custody
arrangements, then the custody decision must be both more individualized and more narrowly focused than any current framework requires.
II
GROUNDING CUSTODY DECISIONS ON PAST ROLES: THE
CASE FOR APPROXIMATION

In this Part, I will argue that past parental roles should be the basis
of future custody after divorce. The optimal legal framework is one that
focuses (almost) exclusively on the past relationship between parents and
child and seeks to approximate as closely as possible the predivorce patterns of parental responsibility in the custody arrangement. The analysis
will show that an "approximation" approach can accomplish the conventional purposes of child custody law more effectively than any alternative. A custody arrangement based on past roles is likely to be less
disruptive to the child. It is also likely to miFror most reliably the true
preferences of parents and for this reason to offer the optimal prospect of
stability over time. By narrowing the inquiry, this framework also avoids
some of the costs of the best interests standard. Because this approach to
custody reconceptualizes postdivorce relationships as a continuation of
the intact family, it can mitigate the adversarial nature of custody disputes in a way that reinforces family ties.
A.

Custody Decisions Guided by Family Roles

1. Minimizing Disruption during the Transition
Divorce, which by any measure is a period of upheaval in a child's
life, should not be treated as an opportunity for restructuring parentchild relationships. Child development experts emphasize the harmful
impact of the disruption associated with divorce, and the link between
continuity of the parent-child relationship and healthy child development.4" Custody law can minimize disruption of the child's habitual routines and relationships after divorce by perpetuating patterns of parental
care established in the intact family. A rule that preserves the continuity
of family relationships would seem to reflect the best interests of the child
as accurately as this elusive concept permits.4 6
The approximation approach suggested in this Article accommo45.

See ROBERT E. EMERY, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND CHILDREN'S ADJUSTMENT 48-104

(1988) (clinical findings on how the disruption from divorce impacts children).
46. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 4-7, 31-39
(1973) (arguing that the goal of custody should be to preserve and protect the relationship between
the child and her psychological parent).
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dates two strands of child development research and theory that have

been drawn into the policy debate over custody and are currently treated
as irreconcilable. The first strand, attachment theory, emphasizes the
importance of the mother-child relationship to the child's healthy development4 7 and has been invoked to support both the tender years presumption4" and the primary caretaker preference. 9 Attachment theory
would support the assertion that the gravest deficiency of the best interests standard is in the risk of disrupting the relationship between the
child and her primary caretaker.5" More recently, however, other
researchers have suggested that the role of fathers in their children's lives
has been undervalued and that attachment theory exaggerates the
uniqueness and exclusiveness of the primary caretaker-child bond. 5
Some observers argue that this research supports a stronger claim for
father custody or, at least, weakens the viability of a primary caretaker
preference.52 Taken together, these two psychological perspectives point
47. As Michael Lamb has stated, "[Miost theorists, whatever their orientation, have assumed
that the mother-infant relationship is unique and vastly more important than any contemporaneous,
or indeed any subsequent, relationships." Michael E. Lamb, The Role of the Father:An Overview, in
THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1, 2 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 1976) (citations
omitted). According to attachment theory, disruption and separation from the mother during early
childhood are associated with human attachment problems. See SELMA FRAIBERG, EVERY CHILD'S
BIRTH RIGHT: IN DEFENSE OF MOTHERING 52 (1977). See generallyMary D.S. Ainsworth, InfantMotherAttachment, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 932 (1979) (overview of attachment theory); Chambers,
supra note 4, at 528-32 (same). The best known application of attachment theory to custody policy
was developed by Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 46, at 31-39. They determined that custody decisions should safeguard the child's need for
continuity of relationships and proposed giving all custody rights to the custodial parent who should
then have the authority to determine the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent. Id. This
response, of course, ignores the importance of continuity of the relationship between the child and
the secondary parent.
48. See Klaff; supra note 23 (applying psychological attachment theory to support an
argument favoring the tender years doctrine).
49. Proponents of the primary caretaker preference argue that one of the most important
factors to be considered in deciding custody is protecting the emotional bond between thd primary
caretaker and the child. See Chambers, supra note 4, at 527. Attachment theory seems to presume
that only one parent can have this intimate caretaking relationship with the child, although
(theoretically) this exclusive bond could be with either the mother or father. See supra note 47.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 15-21 (tracing the diminishing focus on past parenting
under the best interests standard).
51. See Lamb, supra note 47, at 3-6. This claim has gained strength as fathers have assumed a
more active family role. For two comprehensive presentations of research dealing with father-child
relationships, see Chambers, supra note 4, at 532-37; Ross A. Thompson, The Father'sCase in Child
Custody Disputer The Contributions of Psychological Research, in FATHERHOOD AND FAMILY
POLICY 53 (Michael E. Lamb & Abraham Sagi eds., 1983). For a general discussion of father-child
relationships, see infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text; see also Thompson, supra, at 90
(pointing out that work by Goldstein, Freud, and Soinit inaccurately portrays only the primary
caretaker as a psychological parent).
52. In part, the research on fathers' roles has been used to support the position that fathers are
competent parents and could become primary caretakers without detriment to the child. See
Thompson, supra note 51, at 91. This of course does not speak to whether there is a basis for
choosing the primary over the secondary caretaker, given a choice between the two. Thompson
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to a legal response that does not choose between parents or split custody
of the child but rather seeks to gauge the strength of existing bonds and
to perpetuate them through the custody arrangement. Thus, for example, if both parents have been active caretakers, the child should not have
to suffer from the disruptive effects of relegating one parent's status to
that of visitor. On the other hand, if one parent's involvement and care
for the child has been dominant, that strong bond should not be disturbed. The secondary role of the other parent, however, should also be

recognized.
Structuring future custody as I propose could also mitigate the

observed tension between two goals of custody law: encouraging the participation of both parents after divorce and avoiding exposure of the
child to excessive interparental conflict.5 3 The joint custody debate demonstrates this tension, with advocates stressing the harm of lost parental
contact while opponents emphasize the detriment to the child from exposure to interparental conflict. 4 It is plausible to assume that basing custody roles on past patterns of caretaking would provide optimal parental
involvement with minimal conflict.. Joint physical custody, which provides the greatest opportunity for conflict, will be ordered under this
approach only if it replicates the pattern of childrearing that occurred
supports a primary caretaker preference for very young children. Id Chambers also adopts this
approach with some hesitation, concluding after a review of the empirical research that the
difference in the significance of children's relationships to their two parents is less than had been
formerly believed. See Chambers, supra note 4, at 536-37. These findings suggest that the trauma
from losing contact with the primary caretaker might be only marginally more severe than from
losing contact with the other parent.
53. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 3, at 457-58 (noting this tension between parental
involvement and the well-being of the child). Substantial evidence indicates that one aspect of
divorce causing harm to children is their exposure to conflict between their parents. See Edythe S.
Ellison, Issues Concerning ParentalHarmony and Children's PsychosocialAdjustment, 53 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHiATRY 73 (1983) (study of relation between parental harmony and child psychosocial
adjustment); Robert E. Emery, InterparentalConflict and the Children of Discord and Divorce, 92
PSYCHOL. BuLL. 310 (1982) (reviewing data on the relationship between marital turmoil and
behavioral problems in children); Robert E. Emery & K. Daniel O'Leary, Children'sPerceptionsof
MaritalDiscordand BehavioralProblems of Boys and Girls, 10 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 11
(1982) (study of child's response to and perception of marital discord). There is also evidence that
children in single-parent homes with low levels of conflict are better adjusted than children in intact
families with significant conflict. E. Mavis Hetherington et al., Effects of Divorce on Parents and
Children, in NONTRADIONAL FAMILIES: PARENTING AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 233, 260-62
(Michael E. Lamb ed., 1982). This study divided the subjects into four groups: high- and low-tomoderate-conflict divorced parents and married parents. The findings indicate that after two years,
children in high-conflict divorced families had the greatest adjustment problems followed by
children in high-conflict intact families. Low-conffict divorced families had fewer adjustment
problems and low-conflict intact families had the lowest level. See also Michael Rutter, Protective
Factors in Children's Responses to Stress and Disadvantage, in 3 PRIMARY PREVENTION OF
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: SOCIAL COMPETENCE IN CHILDREN 49 (Martha W. Kent & Jon E. Rolf eds.,
1979) (study indicates that children who experience a reduction in family conflict following divorce
show improvement in adjustment).
54. See, eg., Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 3, at 490-92.

1992]

CHILD CUSTODY

during the marriage. In such a situation, the couple's prior experience of

shared responsibility increases the likelihood of mutual commitment,
competency, and respect. Thus, the prospect of a cooperative adjustment

is better than it would be were new roles thrust upon parents .5 The
resentment of joint custody by primary caretaker mothers56 and the
potential conflict that it could generate might be reduced if custody is
formulated on the basis of past roles.
2

ParentalPreferencesAbout Custody and PastFamily Roles
Basing future custody on past parental performance has the poten-

tial not only to reduce instability for the child during the transition
period, but also to better promote continuity in the reconstituted family
over time. 7 This is because predivorce roles may reflect the "true" preferences of parents for their future relationship to their child, and thus
predict future performance more accurately than any alternative.

Although contemporary families do not follow any single prescription
regarding the allocation of parenting roles, the division of roles that a
given couple adopts likely reflects internalized values and preferences,
and may be inticately linked to personal and gender identity for each
spouse." The child herself has expectations about the way that each parent participates in her life that can influence the parents' own prefer-

ences. Other factors reinforce predivorce roles as well. Each parent
tacitly recognizes the other parent's competency in some spheres and
asserts a proprietary claim in others. Moreover, the social context in
55. One study found that parents are most likely to negotiate joint custody agreements when
they both share a perception that the father is an "active and involved parent." Carol R. Lowery,
Maternal andJoint Custody: Differences in the Decision Process, 10 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 303, 312
(1986). The results of another study show that parents who share decisionmaking regarding
childrearing during the separation are more likely to maintain this cooperative relationship two
years later. William S. Coysh et al., ParentalPostdivorce Adjustment in Joint and Sole Physical
Custody Families, J. FAM. IssuEs, Mar. 1989, at 52, 68. Although the authors warned of potential
limitations on the study's applicability to the general divorcing population, id. at 69, they concluded
that the dominant pattern of parental adjustment following divorce is characterized by a continuity
of predivorce to postdivorce functioning, id. at 68.
56. See, eg., Schulman & Pitt, supra note 35, at 540 (criticizing the motivation of joint custody
proponents and arguing for an awareness of the impact of joint custody on the "lives of women who
remain the primary caretakers of children"); see also Fineman, supra note 2, at 761 ("[Mlany women
view joint custody as 'losing' ... [and] bargain away needed property and support benefits to avoid
the risk .... ."); Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 3, at 477-78 (primary caretaker mothers may be at a
bargaining disadvantage under the threat of joint custody because they value child custody more
than their former spouses).
57. Of course, the custody order is not final; it can be modified throughout the child's minority.
See, eg., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108 (Michie 1990) (custody can be modified by petition to or motion
by the court based on changed circumstances). However, in general, minimizing the disruption from
rearranging custody benefits all parties. See Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child
Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757 (1985) (criticizing the current ease with which custody
arrangements can be modified).
58. For a discussion of factors that influence parental role allocation, see infra Part IV.

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:615

which the family has lived-extended family, friends, neighbors, and
employers-creates expectations that promote conformity to these predivorce parental roles.59 Diversity among families should not lead us to
conclude that parental roles are casually assumed or changed. Dramatic
change in the parent-child relationship can be disruptive for both the
parents and the child.'
Consider the following comparison between a joint custody arrangement involving parents who have fully shared parenting responsibilities
during marriage and an arrangement in which a primary caretaker and
an ambitious professional begin to share in the care of their children only
after divorce. Common sense suggests differing prospects for success
between the two arrangements. In the former case, both parents have
invested heavily in their caretaking role, which can be assumed to be an
important part of their lives. Each has likely adjusted to the other's participation in the family, and both function in a social and employment
context that has adapted to their choice of role division. In this situation
of shared caretaking, both parents might value the caretaking relationship equally and would consider any disproportionate diminishment of
this role to be a serious loss. In contrast, a mother who was the primary
caretaker during the marriage is likely to prefer a larger share of custody
than does her professional husband. 6 1 Because most wives spend a
greater proportion of their time doing domestic tasks,6 2 caring for the
child plays a larger part in their lives and personal identities. The primary caretaker mother might find it difficult to adjust to a reduction in
this role or to accept an expansion of the childrearing responsibilities of
her former husband. Furthermore, the father who has been only peripherally involved with his children before divorce might contemplate strain
in both the professional and domestic spheres of his life should he assume
59. Moreover, general societal expectations can be internalized and influence preferences for
custody. One study noted social pressure on mothers to remain at home with their children. See
Judith J. Fischer, Mothers Living Apartfrom Their Children, 32 FAM. REL. 351 (1983). The results
of the same study suggest that mothers who live apart from their children are disapproved of by

society and viewed as unusual, whereas noncustodial fathers are seen as typical and are not subject to
disapproval. Id at 356-57.
60. See Wexler, supra note 57.
61. Mothers in general express a stronger desire to get custody than do fathers. See Mnookin
et al., supra note 34, at 46-49 ("overwhelming majority" of mothers wish to be their children's main
caretaker). This finding might be explained by the typical variance in each parent's child care
responsibility during marriage. See also Chambers, supra note 4, at 542-43 (primary caretakers
suffer more from losing custody than their secondary caretaker counterparts); Fischer, supra note
59, at 353 (noncontrolled study of noncustodial mothers shows incidence of depression). Finally, the
fact that noncustodial mothers have more continued contact with their children than do

noncustodial fathers, see Frank F. Furstenberg et al., The Life Course of Children ofDivorce: Marital
Disruptionand ParentalContact, 48 AM. Soc. RaV. 656, 656-67 (1983), suggests that sustaining the
parent-child relationship is more important to mothers than to fathers.
62. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text (discussion of parenting and gender role
identity).
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a greatly expanded role thereafter. Under these circumstances, both psychological factors and external stresses could interfere with a stable joint

custody arrangement.
My contention that parents are generally inclined to track predi-

vorce roles is consistent with the growing body of empirical research on
custody. Children of divorce in single-parent homes are overwhelmingly

in the custody of their mothers,63 an arrangement that is closer to patterns of parent-child relationships in most intact families than is the
alternative of exclusive paternal custody."4 When the menu of custody
arrangements expands to include joint custody, the importance of predivorce roles seems even clearer. Joint legal custody, which I have argued

reflects typical role allocation more accurately than does sole custody,
has been accepted by both mothers and fathers and is now the prevailing
norm in some jurisdictions.6 In comparison, parents have been less

receptive to joint physical custody,66 suggesting that parents resist radically altering patterns of care and authority established in the intact family. Moreover, researchers in California have found that, even in custody
arrangements that began as joint physical custody, children of divorce

tended over time to live primarily with their mothers.6 7 This trend suggests that parents might be revealing their true preferences through their

conduct, "drifting" toward arrangements that may reflect predivorce
patterns of care.6 1 Parental resistance to the transformation of estab63. See Furstenberg et al., supra note 61, at 667 (nine out often children surveyed were in their
mother's custody).
64. See infra text accompanying note 62. Fathers in intact families tend to be more involved
with older children, see Chambers, supra note 4, at 534-35, and with boys, see Thompson, supra note
51, at 73. After divorce, when fathers do undertake a custodial role, they are "more likely to have
older sons living with them." EMERY, supra note 45, at 85.
65. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
66. Studies indicate that joint legal custody is more popular than joint physical custody.
Research in California and Massachusetts indicates that joint physical custody is relatively less
popular in those states. A group led by Robert Mnookin and Eleanor Maccoby studied over one
thousand California families who filed for divorce in the years 1984-85 and found that although
75.5% of the parents had joint legal custody, only 19.6% had court orders for joint physical custody.
See Mnookin et al., supra note 34, at 60. A Massachusetts study of the records of 500 divorced
families found that only 10% of those families with joint legal custody also had joint physical
custody. See W.P.C. Phear et al.,
An EmpiricalStudy of Custody Arrangements: Joint Versus Sole
Legal Custody, in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENImNG 142, 147 (Jay Folberg ed., 1984); ef
Robert J. Racusin et al.,
FactorsAssociated with Joint Custody Awards, 28 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 164 (1989) (despite a judicial rule in Vermont that joint custody in
general was to be disfavored and a statutory preference in New Hampshire for joint legal custody, a
study found the incidence of joint physicial custody in both states to be identically low).
67. This is true even though California is favorable to joint custody. The California custody
study found a significant "drift" toward de facto mother custody, both in cases in which the father
was awarded physical custody (drift of nearly 23%) and in joint physical custody cases (nearly
40%). Mnookin et al.,
supra note 34, at 67.
68. Because this drift is systematically in the direction of mother custody, it probably cannot
be explained simply as resulting from a difficulty in maintaining joint custody arrangements.
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lished roles might also contribute to the poor adjustment and high relitigation rates associated with court-ordered joint custody in which one
party, usually the mother, resists the arrangement.6 9 In general, the
experience with joint custody is consistent with my hypothesis that parents tend to accept and adapt to this innovation to the extent that it
comports with past roles.
One objection to the argument that divorced parents prefer to track
predivorce roles is that parents are directly expressing their preferences
when they pursue their custody claims and that this would seem to be a
more accurate measure of the value they place on custody than are inferential claims about "real" preferences. For several reasons, however, the
fact that a parent seeks custody might tell us less about his preference or
his probable performance as a caretaker than does the past relationship
with the child. First, parents might pursue custody for strategic or spiteful purposes that distort actual preferences.7 0 Second, a parent might
seek a disproportionate amount of custody simply because it is the closest
available alternative to his actual desires. For example, an award of sole
custody might exceed a parent's preferences, yet better reflect the value
he attaches to custody than would the remaining alternative of visitation.
Finally, parents might seek a disproportionate amount of custody
because they want more time with the child in absolute terms than their
proportionate share (based on their past participation) would dictate.
Because each parent's enjoyment of the child's time is usually mutually
exclusive following divorce, it is possible that neither parent will be fully
69. Joint custody advocates initially argued that reitigation rates would be lower than in sole
custody, and an early study confirmed this result under joint custody arrangements with the consent
of both parents. Court-ordered joint custody in which one parent was forced to accept the
arrangement had refitigation rates comparable to those in sole custody. See Frederic W. llfeld, Jr.,
et al., Does Joint Custody Work? A First Look at Outcome Data of Relitigation, 139 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 62, 64-65 (1982). Later studies have shown higher joint custody relitigation rates.
Steinman and colleagues found that parents whose joint custody arrangement was court-ordered had
the least successful relationships and were most likely to relitigate. Susan Steinman et al., A Study of
Parents Who Sought Joint Custody Following Divorce Who Reaches Agreement and Sustains Joint
Custody and Who Returns to Court, 24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 545 (1985). A study of
500 family records by Phear and colleagues found the instances of relitigation to be the same
between joint and sole custody families. See W.P.C. Phear et al., supra note 66, at 151. California
recently revised its joint custody statute to clarify the fact that it contains no presumption favoring
joint custody. Act of Sept. 27, 1988, ch. 1442, § 1, 1988 Cal. Stat. 4927, 4927-28 (codified as
amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(d) (West Supp. 1991)). Proponents ofthe statutory amendment
cited research evidence finding harmful effects of court-ordered joint custody. See Family Law
Issues Relating to SB 1296, SB 1306, and SB 1341 (and SB 13), Public Hearing Before the Cal.
Assembly Comm on Judiciary, 1987 Regular Sess. 49-87 (Dec. 14, 1987).
70. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing parental bargaining in custody
disputes); infra Section III.C.1 (same). In addition, the postdivorce emotional context can impair
parents' judgment and disable them from seeking their true goals. See Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce
Bargaining:The Limits on Private Ordering in THE RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT 364, 367-70
(John M. Eekelaar & Sanford N. Katz eds., 1984).
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satisfied with the proportionate share of time allotted to him or her based
on past participation.
In the long run, however, sorting out "true" from expressed preferences could misdirect our attention. More important than the desires
parents verbalize at the time of divorce are the deeper preferences
revealed by their behavior before divorce and their adaptation afterwards. Given that the child's time is finite, it is quite possible that maximum joint satisfaction will usually be realized by measuring preferences
proportionately. This Article argues that predivorce roles provide the
best available guide for predicting, at the time of divorce, which arrangement will be most stable, and for planning the uncertain venture of
postdivorce family life.
Implicit in this analysis is the conclusion that a rule that reflects
parents' preferences for custody is also in the best interests of the child.
This conclusion is dissonant with much rhetoric about custody, which
rarely focuses on the impact of parental satisfaction on the success of
future family relations. My analysis, however, argues that the premise
upon which the law operates in dealing with intact families should not be
forgotten upon divorce. Parents adopt roles and functions in the family
according to complex sets of values and preferences and with little legal
supervision. The law can look to these family patterns as the best reflection of the parents' true preferences and the best predictor of the future
stability of custody arrangements. This analysis does not deny that substantial change in parent-child relationships occurs in many divorces.
Nor do I argue that insurmountable barriers face parents when divorce
signifies substantial reordering of their predivorce roles. Nevertheless,
the law has been naive in assuming that substantially different family
roles can be dictated by fiat. To the extent that custody arrangements
involve a major restructuring of parental roles, the risk of instability
might well be increased.
B.

The Approximation Framework-Reconceptualizing
the Custody Decision

1.

Introducing the Framework

A custody decision rule that seeks to approximate past patterns of
care will demand a narrower, more quantitative inquiry than the best
interests standard requires. In most cases, only factual evidence relating
to parental participation in the child's life during the marriage will be
relevant under the framework. The approximation inquiry, like the primary caretaker preference, focuses on the amount of time spent with the
child, the extent to which the parent engaged in tasks that contributed to
the child's basic care and development, and the parent's participation in
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decisions relevant to the child.7 1 Unlike the primary caretaker preference, however, this evidence does not serve as a basis for choosing one
parent over the other but rather for allocating time and decisional
authority between the parents, who presumably will both continue in
their parental roles. Following this scheme, intact family structures will
be located on a continuum, varying from those in which one parent has
assumed all child care responsibility at one end to those in which all
parenting tasks and decisions are shared at the other. Under the approximation framework, custody arrangements following divorce will reflect
these differences.
This approach excludes much of the qualitative evidence that is traditionally employed and evaluated in custody proceedings, and thereby
reduces the destructive costs of resolving these disputes. In the ordinary
case, evidence of each parent's moral character, lifestyle preferences,
quality of past care, depth of attachment, and potential capacity to provide care is irrelevant under the approximation approach. Shifting the
analysis from a qualitative inquiry into who will be a better parent (or
even who has been a better parent) to a quantitative assessment of past
participation ameliorates some objectionable features of the best interests
inquiry. First, each party's incentive to exhume every vestige of unsavory evidence about the spouse's habits and character is reduced, a beneficial effect given the necessity of future interactions between the former
spouses about childrearing concerns. Second, the restricted evidentiary
basis limits the opportunity for the judge's personal values and biases to
shape the outcome. Finally, the potential for error in applying the
approximation rule is significantly less than under a more traditional
inquiry because the assessment is quantitative and retrospective. In contrast, a reordering of child care relationships requires speculative prediction of future parental performance, a judgment that is inherently
unreliable,7 2 particularly when made in the context of divorce. Information that is acquired at a time of personal and family upheaval concerning character, stability, parenting skills, and the parent-child relationship
is highly susceptible to distortion.73
71. The criteria applied under the West Virginia primary caretaker preference rule are relevant
here. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981); supra note 39 (outlining these
criteria).
72. Much controversy has surrounded the issue of the extent to which legal judgments should
be based on predictions of future behavior. For example, a heated debate exists concerning the
accuracy of clinical predictions by mental health professionals of the future violent behavior of their
patients. See JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981) (Nat'l
Inst. Mental Health Crime & Delinquency Series No. 81-921) (describing error in clinical
prediction).
73. For a discussion of the limits of psychological expertise in this context, see Mnookin, supra
note 4, at 258-60; Lois A. Weithorn & Thomas Grisso, PsychologicalEvaluationsin Divorce Custody:
Problems, Principles, and Procedures, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS
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Even those who concede the pitfalls of evaluative criteria might
object to the narrow focus of an approximation inquiry in cases in which
the child has received inadequate care before divorce. To be sure, if
parenting has been so deficient that justification exists for state intervention on grounds of abuse or neglect, then a restructuring of family
responsibilities is desirable.74 However, the fact that the family is before
the court to change its legal status should not, in itself, call for a reassignment of parental roles. In the ordinary case, one parent should not be
heard to complain that although the other spouse participated in the
child's life before divorce, the quality of that participation was wanting
and now warrants restriction.
2. Applying the Approximation Standard
Even if the approximation framework is a theoretically superior
approach for resolving custody disputes, it is only useful if it can be
translated into a rule that courts can apply with reasonable accuracy at
reasonable cost. Translating evidence about past parental care and
responsibility into a plan for future custody will often be a formidable

task that is prone to error.75 Moreover, it may be logistically impossible
for courts to mirror in the custody arrangement the intricate patterns of
parental care and responsibility that existed in the intact family. For
example, the custody arrangement will usually not reflect the specific
division of tasks and decisions that the parents had previously allocated
between themselves. Each parent will usually perform all the daily caretaking responsibilities while the child is living with him or her.
157 (Lois A. Weithora ed., 1987). The following factors strengthen the possibility for distortion of
the qualitative assessment of parenting and family functioning at the time of divorce. First, the
emotional nature of the divorce context can bring out the worst behavior of the parents, so that
inferences drawn during this time about their parenting ability and stability in more normal times
may be grossly inaccurate. Second, both parents can have incentives to distort information about
themselves and the other parent, making it extremely difficult to obtain an accurate picture of family
functioning.
74. In other words, the court deciding child custody upon divorce should apply the standard
for intervention in an ongoing parent-child relationship that is applied in an abuse/neglect
proceeding. Under this analysis, unless parental care was so deficient as to warrant state supervision
of the family or removal of the child from parental custody, a qualitative assessment of predivorce
parenting should not be relevant to the custody allocation.
75. The approximation framework itself can motivate predivorce behavioral effects that
complicate the factual inquiry and increase the risk of error. Parties contemplating divorce in the
near future, or simply unhappy with their marriages, might behave in a way that exaggerates their
participation in their child's life. Their purpose can be to extract an advantage on settlement (either
a greater share of custody or of assets) or to influence a custody adjudication. This type of
predivorce conduct can subtly interfere with parents' inclinations to support each other's
involvement in childrearing. I cannot suggest a complete cure for this distortion. However, the
incidence of this behavior could be reduced and its effect neutralized if courts investigate dramatic,
otherwise unexplained changes in the level of child care occurring shortly before divorce. By
examining parental roles from a long-range perspective and evaluating participation over time,
courts will be less likely to give recent behavior undue weight.
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If the proposed framework is to guide custody decisionmaking without excessive enforcement costs, it must characterize predivorce family
arrangements by using simplifying categories or rules of thumb to ease
the judicial task of applying the rule. For example, three categories can
be constructed that roughly reflect various patterns of parental involvement, although necessarily with less accuracy than a more precise
description of parental roles would provide. The categories would span a
continuum from a family in which both parents equally share child care
responsibility to one in which one parent is uninvolved while the other
shoulders most of the burden. In current parlance, the former family's
custody arrangement looks like joint physical and legal custody, the latter like sole custody and visitation. A third category, lying between these
two poles, would include families with two involved parents, one of
whom bears the greater burden of child care responsibility. A family in
this third category might have a custody arrangement that is similar to
joint legal custody, with the child's principal residence being with the
primary caretaker and secondary residence with the other parent. The
actual time allocation between residences would be based on each parent's participation in the child's life before divorce. Thus, a court ordering custody for a family in this group might use a variety of formulas to
allocate the child's time between households, designating time with each
parent as a proportion of the month or week. For example, the order
might direct that the child live with an actively participating secondary
caretaker twelve days a month (or three days a week), while a less
involved secondary parent might be awarded physical custody eight days
a month (or two days a week).76 Adjustments to accommodate the
child's schedule might be necessary, with compensating time allocated
during the summer months. Courts might also explore the areas of
authority held by each parent before divorce. Thus, if one parent made
all the decisions relating to education, the custody order might reflect
this. 77 Alternatively, courts could presume shared authority in the typical family and allocate more specifically only if disputes arise.
A skeptic might argue, and I concede, that the approximation
framework, implemented as I have suggested, only roughly bases future
custody arrangements on predivorce roles. Moreover, even with the simplifying categories, courts might misapply the standard. One might
fairly ask whether the approximation framework in practice represents
any tangible advance over existing custody decision rules. What distin76.

A more complex approach would involve a rough assessment of the proportion of care

given by each parent (e.g., 60/40 to 80/20). In my view, although the latter approach is more
precise, its complexity would unnecessarily increase the procedural costs of making the custody
determination.
77. A very hard case would be one in which one parent was very involved in decisionmaking
but spent little time with the child.
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guishes this approach from other custody frameworks is not that the categories describing outcomes are new, although few states in practice offer
the broad range of arrangements available under the proposed framework. Rather, I believe the approximation criterion differs because it is
more likely to direct custody arrangements that maximize the collective
interests of all the affected parties. The framework clearly tells courts
what counts and what does not in deciding custody claims. If what
counts-predivorce involvement in the child's life-provides a sounder
base for future arrangements than the criteria weighed under other
frameworks, then even the rough replication of prior roles embodied in
the rule of thumb categories will likely yield more satisfactory outcomes
than will other decision principles. To be sure, error will inevitably
result when courts make the often complex evidentiary judgments necessary to determine the correct custody category. The impact of such error
is likely to be far less severe, however, than that incurred under other
frameworks. Because their essential premises are flawed, conventional
approaches create outcomes that offer less promise for stable and successful custody.78
3.

The Symbolism of Approximation

Resolving the issue of how a child's time will be spent after divorce
often involves conflict.79 It would be naive to hope that a legal framework can radically alter the essential character of the dispute. Nonetheless, the proposed approximation framework helps to mitigate the
adversarial nature of the custody decision in two ways. First, the outcome loses some of its character as a prize to be captured by one parent
or the other."0 Neither parent loses if both have invested in the relationship with the child. Thus, in the context of the approximation inquiry,
the categories that describe custody outcomes take on more neutral
meanings as alternative blueprints, one of which best reflects past relationships. Second, the antagonistic tone of the dispute may be muted
because of the nature of the approximation inquiry, which considers
more concrete and quantitative factors than do inquiries under current
78.

See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (describing problems with traditional

custody proceedings).
79. At a minimum, conflict can come from two sources. First, the anger often associated with
marital breakdown is likely to infect the custody decision process. Second, each parent might want
more time with the child than the amount available to that parent. Because the parents often cannot
enjoy time with the child together after divorce, the child's time must be split between them,
resulting in less total time for each parent. See also supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing
problems arising during custody proceedings).
80. The adversarial nature of custody disputes is not limited to cases of sole custody. Even
joint custody cases can assume strong adversarial tones. For example, if one party requests joint
custody against the wishes of the other, conflict often arises and "unconscionable bargaining" can
result. See Elster, supra note 1, at 6 & n.22.
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frameworks. Although, to be sure, parties will dispute who was the more
involved parent, inflammatory evidence about each parent's character
and about quality and competency of parenting is not useful to the court
and can be excluded, reducing, somewhat the potential for hostile
exchange.81
The focus under the approximation inquiry on each parent's past
care of the child also underscores relational values that are somewhat
obscured under conventional custody rules.82 Despite rhetoric to the

contrary, modem custody law has as much to do with the legal rights of
parents as with the welfare of the child. Custody has become viewed as a
valuable legal entitlement to be won in a fair contest between parties with
equal legal claims derived solely from their status as parents. As I have
argued, the liberal premises of the process push the substantive inquiry in
a direction that reduces the central importance of the past parental relationship with the child. The influence of liberal ideology is less pronounced under the approximation inquiry because parental rights are
interwoven with notions of care and responsibility. Although each parent might have an equal legal claim to custody at their child's birth, the
success of subsequent claims will depend on each parent's commitment
and participation during the child's life.83 Without sacrificing fairness to
parents, approximation fulfills better than other frameworks the rhetori81. Moreover, resentment that arises because the custody rule does not adequately consider a
parent's past investment in her relationship with her child will be reduced.
82. Professor Katharine Bartlett has argued that traditional custody law expresses an ideal of
parenthood that is based on notions of exchange and individual rights. She proposes instead that the
law "re-express" parenthood in terms of responsibility and relationship. Katharine T. Bartlett, ReExpressing Parenthood,98 YALE L.J. 293, 294-95 (1988); see also Bartlett & Stack, supra note 9, at
34 (joint custody rule emphasizes responsibility rather than rights). Martha Minow has criticized
traditional conceptions of family law as being based on individualistic, masculine values while
discounting feminine values of care and responsibility. See Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath
Everything That Grows'. Toward a History ofFamily Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 819, 893-94. Others
have commented on the impact of the individual rights' ideology on family law's portrayal of
relations between family members. See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation
ofAmerican Family Law, 83 MICH. L. Rav. 1803 (1985) (liberal individualism has diminished the
law's "discourse in moral terms" on family relations); Elizabeth S. Scott, RationalDecisionmaking
About Marriageand Divorce, 76 VA. L. Rav. 9 (1990) (the importance of the value of commitment
in family relationships has been obscured under modem divorce law).
83. This approach is grounded in constitutional doctrine. The United States Supreme Court
has evaluated the stature of the parental rights of unmarried fathers by analyzing the extent to which
the father has assumed parental responsibility and established a relationship with his child. In Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), the Court stated:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he
grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future,
he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship ....
Id. at 262. The Court also commented that "a natural father who has played a substantial role in
rearing his child has a greater claim to constitutional protection than a mere biological parent." Id.
at 262 n.18.
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cal promise that custody is about children's welfare rather than parents'
rights.

In this Section I have attempted to explain how the approximation
approach to custody determination theoretically produces beneficial
changes in the custody process. These benefits include mitigation of the

adversarial nature of the custody decision and increased emphasis on
family relational values. In the next Part, I will support these theoretical
and intuitive arguments with a more formal analysis of the approximation approach. Using the basic tenets of bargaining theory, I will demonstrate that the approximation approach is more likely to enhance
cooperative rather than adversarial aspects of custody dispute resolution.
III
BARGAINING THEORY AND CUSTODY DECIsION RULES

Most divorce settlements and custody arrangements are decided
through a process of negotiation between the spouses. Nonetheless,
when divorcing spouses bargain "in the shadow of the law," the prevailing legal rules regulating divorce and custody can affect the negotiation
process substantially.8 4 Custody negotiation and the goals of custody
law have a highly interactive relationship. In the context of divorce,
negotiation and bargaining generate unique psychological and economic
costs that can negate some of the benefits the law anticipates from a preferred custody rule. In turn, bargaining costs are partly a function of the
custody rule itself, because divorcing parents will negotiate within the
framework established by the law. This interdependence suggests that a
key measure of the effectiveness of a custody rule is its impact on the
bargaining process. In this Part, I argue that a custody rule that mirrors
the actual preferences of parents will reduce harmful bargaining costs
and thereby better realize the goals of custody law.
A.
L

The Characterof Divorce Bargaining

BargainingInteractions

Divorce bargaining is complex, particularly when the custody of
children is at stake. The range of issues to be resolved, the past and
future relationships of the parties, and the role that anger and spite can
play result in a bargaining situation that could potentially involve many
different types of bargaining "games" or interactions.8 5 When the parties
84. In a landmark article, Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhouser demonstrated how
substantive divorce and custody rules affect the bargaining process outside the courtroom. See
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
85. Game theory is a formal theoretical approach to the problem of resolving conflicts of
interest. For two classic treatments of game theory, see DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA,
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to a divorce settlement agree to a custody arrangement through an interaction that maximizes the benefits for all parties, then the negotiation is

analogous to a positive-sum game.8 6 Divorce settlement can also have

the character of a zero-sum interaction, however, when each party battles
for a larger share of a finite amount of property and custody.8 7 At its
worst, divorce bargaining can diminish or destroy the value of the benefits to be distributed.88 Thus, when parents' bargaining over custody
damages future family relationships,8 9 the process is analogous to a negative-sum game.

Two aspects of custody disputes create the potential for a positivesum interaction that produces value through cooperation. First,
although custody involves a finite amount of time and authority to be
divided, parents may prefer different amounts. Thus, an outcome that
GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY (1957); THOMAS C. SCHELLING,

According to Luce and Raiffa, game theory is based on
certain assumptions: that each individual seeks to maximize his own utility; that the various possible
outcomes of a particular situation are well specified; that individual "players" have consistent
preferences among these outcomes; and that all players know the preference patterns of the others.
LUCE & RAIFFA, supra, at 4-5. Game theorists acknowledge that some of their assumptions do not
reflect the reality of interest-conflict resolution. See, e.g., id, at 5; SCHELLING, supra, at 4. These
assumptions are relaxed in modern game theory, which focuses on noncooperative games involving
players with asymmetric and imperfect information. For a comprehensive treatment, see ERIC
THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1963).

RASMUSSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (1990). Thus,

game theory should become increasingly useful in understanding "real life" conflict resolution
situations such as divorce bargaining.
86. A positive-sum game can produce value through cooperation. One type of positive-sum
game is a pure coordination game in which both parties have the same goal. Charades is an example.
In such a game, the process of negotiation involves coordinating mutually consistent expectations
rather than accommodating adverse expectations, so that the parties win or lose together. See
generally SCHELLING, supra note 85, at 89-99 (coordination games). A variant of the pure
coordination game can be found in problem solving theory. Fisher and Ury popularized "principled
negotiation," problem solving that conceives of disputes as problems that can be resolved jointly to
mutual advantage and solves any conflicts of interest that arise by employing fair standards
"independent of the will of either side." ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETrING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENTS WITHOUT GIVING IN xii (Bruce Patton ed., 1981). For an application

of problem solving to legal negotiation, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal
Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984).
87. In a zero-sum game, total winnings less total losses equals zero. There is no value in
cooperation because the players have precisely opposite preferences and there is no outcome that
they would both prefer. See MICHAEL BACHARACH, ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF GAMES 7-8

(1976); LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 85, at 85. "[F]or every pair of outcomes if one player prefers the
first, the other must prefer the second." BACHARACH, supra, at 8. A zero-sum game is a game of
pure redistribution; no value is produced or destroyed. See Robert Cooter et al., Bargainingin the
Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J.LEGAL STUD. 225, 227 (1982).
88. The destructive potential of divorce negotiations was graphically suggested by a recent
film. See THE WAR OF THE ROSES (20th Century Fox 1989). Using their house as a battleground,

the spouses set out to attain their adverse goals, sacrificing everything in the process. In a more
realistic setting, assets can be depleted, spouses and children emotionally scarred, and future
relationships impaired by such adversarial divorce negotiations.
89. As the analysis will demonstrate, the damage can affect both parent-child relationships and
relationships between parents.
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maximizes their joint preferences will produce value. Second, what is at
stake is not simply time and authority, but the future relationships

between parents and child, the value of which may be either enhanced or
diminished by the bargaining process. In contrast, property settlement
and alimony issues, although they have positive-sum aspects, 90 are more
suited to resolution through zero-sum interactions. Because both parties
presumably want as large a portion as possible of a finite amount of

assets, the potential for increasing value through cooperation is more
limited than in custody negotiations.
Although bargaining games tend to be positive-sum because both
parties benefit from the exchange, 9 ' this might not be true when divorcing spouses exchange custody for property. 92 First, such exchanges systematically tend to undermine the financial security of custodial parents
and thus, ultimately, of children. 9 Moreover, in the unique context of
divorce negotiation, bargaining costs can spiral, becoming so burdensome as to overwhelm the possibility of a beneficial outcome.94 Thus, the
prospect for successful resolution can be enhanced to the extent that bargaining over economic issues can be separated from the process of deciding custody. 9" Combining these issues will tend to highlight zero-sum
features of the interaction.
2. BargainingCosts and Impediments to Bargaining
Several kinds of bargaining costs can impede successful divorce set-

tlement. Although all negotiations incur ordinary transaction costs asso90. Parties attach preferences and desires for marital assets for reasons other than monetary
value. For example, one party might associate idiosyncratic value to particular assets, while the
other might have a preference for liquidity. See Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits
on Private Ordering, in THE RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CoNFLIcr 364, 367 (John M. Eekelaar &
Sanford N. Katz eds., 1984). Thus, a cooperative interaction that distributes assets in a way that
maximizes the parties' joint interests will enhance value.
91. Bargaining games have been called "mixed-motive games" because parties have both
common and conflicting interests. SCHELLING, supra note 85, at 88-89. For a discussion of twoperson bargaining games, see generally LucE & RAIFFA, supra note 85, at 114-54. Cooperative
bargaining divides the stakes to produce a joint benefit or surplus. Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase,
11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1982); Cooter et al., supra note 87, at 227-28.
92. Cf Scott & Dedeyn, supra note 3, at 477-81 (mothers who strongly desire custody might
make financial concessions to obtain it); supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (equal parental
rights to custody might give fathers a bargaining advantage over former wives who desire custody).
93. Many women care more about obtaining custody than do men, and might trade away their
claims to support and property to insure getting their children. See Neely, supra note 24, at 177-81
(discussing the trading of children for money in divorce proceedings).
94. For a discussion of the unique bargaining costs associated with divorce, see infra notes 10306 and accompanying text.
95. Separation of custody negotiations from bargaining about property and support is a goal
that cannot be fully realized, of course; child and spousal support is interwoven with custody, and
even property issues such as the disposition of the family home are linked to custody. What I hope
to demonstrate, however, is that the tendency to exchange custody for property is at least partly
dependent on the applicable custody rule itself.
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ciated with assembling the parties and exchanging information,9 6 dispute
settlement negotiations also tend to generate peculiar psychological and
economic costs. In the case of divorce bargaining, these costs are likely
to be especially onerous and to create substantial impediments to cooperative settlements." Divorce bargaining is costly in large part because of
the psychological turmoil that often accompanies marital breakdown. In
this stressful environment, any interaction between spouses can intensify
feelings of anger, rejection, guilt, resentment, and frustration.9 8 These
emotions often negatively influence bargaining behavior, and therefore
reduce the prospects for a satisfactory agreement. 99 The fallout of the
parents' stress is also likely to impose psychological costs on children. 0o
These general psychological costs multiply if one or both parties are
motivated by spite. Although spite occasionally motivates behavior in
other bargaining situations,10 1 it is a familiar aspect of divorce negotia96. According to Coase, these transaction costs include the time and money required "to
inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a
bargain, [and] to draw up the contract," among other things. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
97. This is so in part because of the past intimacy and estrangement of the parties and in part
because for some couples the subject of the dispute, custody and property, is a substitute for a larger
battle. See Andre P. Derdeyn, ParentalAnger,29 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 116 (1983).
98. Both spouses experience many forms of stress during the divorce process, including guilt,
humiliation, anger, and diminished self-worth. See Kenneth Kressel et al., ProfessionalIntervention
in Divorce: The Views of Lawyers, Psychotherapists,and Clergy, in DIVORCE AND SEPARATION:
CONTEXT, CAUSES, AND CONSEQUENCES 246, 256-57 (George Levinger & Oliver C. Moles eds.,
1979). The stress can be caused by the rapid change in life circumstances, the nonmutuality of the
divorce decision, and/or the distress of separation from the spouse. Id.
99. Robert Mnookin describes how the emotional distress of divorce impairs bargaining
behavior. See Mnookin, supra note 70. The assumption that bargaining parties can make rational,
self-interested judgments and accurately assess their preferences is questionable in the divorce
context. Parties might be unable to negotiate at all, or might agree to terms they later regret. See id.
at 367-68. Mnookin advocates private ordering, "the process by which the parties themselves decide
what the consequences of divorce should be," id. at 365, but concludes that safeguards are necessary
to protect a temporarily incapable divorcing spouse from exploitation by the other during this
transition period, id. at 369-70. Some bargaining dynamics that are typical in the postseparation
emotional setting lead to unsatisfactory settlements. One involves a guilty spouse who wishes to end
the marriage and is ready to make great concessions. The problem is compounded when she
bargains with an angry spouse who escalates demands, motivated by feelings of anger and
humiliation. A second pattern consists of an aggressive initiator of the separation who negotiates
with a spouse willing to accept any terms because of diminished feelings of self-worth. Kressel et al.,
supra note 98, at 256. These authors observe that passivity in negotiating can result in an
unsatisfactory settlement. See id. at 260.
100. Many observers have commented on the psychological costs to children of the adversary
process. See, eg., Elster, supra note 1,at 1-2; Robert E. Emery, et al., Divorce, Children,and Social
Policy, in 1 CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH AND SOCIAL POLICY 189, 209-10 (Harold W.
Stevenson & Alberta E. Siegel eds., 1984); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert Emery, Child Custody
Dispute Resolution, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS, supra note 73, at 24.
101. See Arthur A. Lef, Injury, Ignorance, andSpite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80
YALE L.J. 1, 18-27 (1970) (describing spite as one factor contributing to bargaining breakdown in
debtor/creditor disputes in which the outcome of adjudication is clear).
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tions. 102 Spiteful conduct is peculiarly costly because the actor is not

constrained by rational self-interest. The spiteful party knows that his
conduct is costly to himself as well as to his opponent but is willing to
pay a price for the gratification of inflicting injury and defeating his
opponent's prospects for a satisfactory outcome. 10 3 Spite thus exacerbates bargaining costs, greatly enhancing the likelihood of a negativesum interaction.
Strategic behavior, in the form of threats, bluffs, or other oppor-

tunistic conduct, is another costly impediment to settlement. This
behavior is a part of many adversarial negotiations"°

and certainly is

common in divorce contests. For example, a parent who is indifferent to
having custody might claim otherwise, presenting his spouse with the
choice of relinquishing property or testing the threat to litigate custody.

Such a threat can be very effective in the not-unusual case in which the
parent who is the target of the strategic behavior strongly desires custody

and is risk-averse about the uncertainty of adjudication. Strategic behavior generally increases the costs of bargaining;'0 5 because of the volatile

emotional setting, this effect is magnified in divorce negotiations. Unnecessary transaction costs are incurred and psychological costs mount, the
latter falling disproportionately on the party who is the target of the
maneuvers. In this situation, patterns of cooperation are likely to be
replaced by reciprocal retaliation. 10 6 Although the parties might ulti102. This is due to the intense emotional distress associated with divorce. The period following
separation has been described as a crisis stage in which the parties experience feelings" 'both natural
and nasty."' Mnookin, supra note 70, at 368 (quoting I. RiccI, MOM'S HOUSE/DAD'S HOUSE 75
(1980)). One observer commented that "'this is the worst possible time to make any permanent
decisions---especially legal ones. Thinking and believing the worst about each other is one of the
chief hazards of this stage ....... Ia at 368-69 (quoting I. Ricci, MOM'S HOUsE/DAD'S HOUSE 70
(1980)).
103. See Cooter et al., supra note 87, at 239 (defining spite as one party's willingness to accept a
less favorable result in order to impair the opponent's outcome). Spite can have the effect of
artificially changing preferences and reducing the possibility of a cooperative outcome. For example,
consider a couple, A and B, whose respective preferences for custody are equal sharing. An
agreement that allocates custody in this way will maximize the joint benefits of custody.
Nevertheless, if B, motivated by spite, decides that depriving A of custody is worth more than
sharing custody, then a conflictual resolution is inevitable.
104. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 86, at 775-77 (criticizing the conventional literature on
negotiation strategies for assuming universal applicability of the "stylized ritual of offer/response,
counteroffer/counterresponse," id at 777); see also Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 84, at 973
(arguing that opportunities for strategic behavior exist, in part, because of uncertainty about the
other side's preferences and about the outcome of litigation).
One feature of divorce bargaining tends to mitigate strategic behavior. Because parties in this
context know each other well and can be expected to be more familiar than most bargainers with
each other's preferences, they can be better able to evaluate bluffs and distinguish serious from
strategic threats. However, spite can distort preferences and make such evaluations unreliable.
105. For a discussion of the costly impact of strategic behavior on bargaining, see Cooter, supra
note 91, at 17-18.
106. Parties bargaining about divorce are like players in a repeated-interaction game. The
responses of such players are contingent on each other's actions. See ANATOL RAPOPORT &
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mately reach agreement despite strategic behavior, the benefits of cooperation are lost.
3.

Custody Outcomes and the Costs of Bargaining
The success of custody negotiations, in both the short and long
term, is determined in important ways by the extent to which bargaining
costs are contained. A satisfactory agreement is most likely to emerge if
cooperative patterns of interaction are reinforced and conflict is cabined.
By the same token, if costs mount excessively, not only will the process
be burdensome but a less-than-optimal outcome becomes more likely.
Any inclination of parties to cooperate in this often unstable environment
can be transformed by strategic or spiteful conduct into a destructive
retaliatory exchange. Ultimately the tenuous cooperative pattern breaks
down, resulting in either conflictual negotiation or litigation.
In several ways, impediments such as spite or strategic behavior can
result in bargaining failure. Parties can misinterpret real and strategic
threats and otherwise misjudge each other's intentions. A spiteful party
might negotiate recklessly, purposely risking bargaining breakdown to
punish the other spouse. The result is the loss of the optimal outcome of
bargaining: an agreement by which the party who values the entitlement
most receives it and the parties share the joint benefits of the move from
the less valued to the more valued use.10 7 Moreover, the failure to reach
agreement adds the substantial costs of adjudication. In contrast to parties negotiating in other contexts, divorcing spouses cannot walk away
when bargaining fails; they must resolve the dispute in court. 108
The long-term effects of bargaining are even more important.
Because of the link between the bargaining process and the goals of custody law, cooperative interactions are uniquely beneficial and conflict is
uniquely destructive in this negotiation setting. If custody is decided
through cooperative dealing in which bargaining costs are contained,
future family relationships can be enhanced in important ways. Not only
is the resulting agreement likely to yield a mutually satisfactory arrangement, but the stage is set for future coordination and communication
between the parents. By the same token, because of the parties' ongoing
relationship, the effects of substantial bargaining costs also endure well
M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA: A STUDY IN CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 67-71
(1965) (developing a mathematical model accounting for reciprocal patterns of cooperation and
conflict that emerge and are reinforced by a lock-in effect). If one party uses strategic threats or
engages in spiteful conduct, the other will often retaliate, setting off a series of reciprocal hostile
exchanges that can be self-propelling. Id. at 134.
107. Cooter challenges the assumption of the Coase Theorem that bargaining parties will agree
to an efficient outcome in the absence of transaction costs. According to Cooter, Coase's optimistic
assumption ignores the problem of strategic behavior. Cooter, supra note 91, at 14-19.
108. Settlement negotiations are a form of bilateral monopoly in which neither party has any
alternative bargaining partner.
ALBERT
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beyond the custody decision. Conflictual interactions often result in lingering psychological and economic detriment that undermine the benefits
of future custodial arrangements. The harmful effects of divorce on
children are caused primarily by reduced contact with one parent, conflict between the parents, and by economic deprivation." °9 Although
these detrimental effects do not derive solely or even primarily from the
process of deciding custody, the costs of this process can exaggerate the
destructive psychological and economic impact of marital dissolution on
children. Anger and bitterness generated in conflictual negotiation or
adjudication can poison the prospects of future cooperation between parents. The parties can continue the conflict, or the loser in the custody
dispute can withdraw. Either outcome reduces the prospects for stable
family relationships in the future; both the relationship between parents
and parent-child relationships are impaired by stressful, angry custody
battles.
B.

Custody Decision Rules and the Preferences of Parties

Because bargaining in the volatile context of divorce can destroy the
benefits of future custody, a decision rule that contains bargaining costs
furthers the substantive goals of custody law. Toward this end, the optimal rule would allocate legal entitlement to custody so as to reflect the
actual preferences of the parties. For parties who are inclined to interact
cooperatively, such a rule would reduce the incentive for them to bargain
about custody at all. These parties have nothing to exchange because the
law gives to each the amount of custody desired. If the rule reduces the
incentive to bargain, the costs associated with bargaining behavior are
also reduced.
A rule that promotes cooperative agreement about custody without
bargaining is particularly desirable in this context. In other bargaining
settings, as the Coase theorem demonstrates, the initial placement of the
legal entitlement does little to impede an efficient bargaining outcome.' 1 0
This is not so in the unstable context of divorce negotiations because the
delicate process of trading custody rights holds the potential for generating punishing costs. To be sure, even if the decision rule tracks their
preferences precisely, some parties will engage in uncooperative behavior
109. For a comprehensive discussion of social science research on the impact of divorce on
children, see generally EMERY, supra note 45, at 33-70.
110. According to the Coase theorem, under specified conditions parties will bargain to an
efficient outcome so that the entitlement will be held by the party who values it more. This outcome
occurs because the party who values the entitlement less, if he fails to trade it, forgoes the value that
the party who values it more would trade in exchange for the entitlement. Thus, regardless of how
the entitlement to custody is allocated, the theorem predicts that the parties will bargain to an
outcome in which their actual preferences for custody are satisfied. See Coase,supra note 96, at 5, 8
(illustrating the theorem's operation).
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out of spite or as part of a strategic plan. Even in these situations, however, a preference-backed rule will reduce costs because it will reveal to
both parties the simple fact that there is nothing to trade. Even if bargaining fails altogether, costs are minimized in that the adjudicated outcome tracks the parties' joint preferences for custody and is thus, by
definition, efficient.1 1
A rule that awards custody based on the actual preferences of the
parties benefits the child as well. Because the rule reduces the destructive
costs of resolving custody disputes, it will reduce short-term stress and
enhance the opportunity for unimpaired parent-child relationships in the
postdivorce setting. Moreover, allocations reflecting actual preferences
are likely to be more stable because satisfied parents will be less motivated to seek different arrangements. Thus, if the custody rule tracks
parents' preferences, children also will reap both short-term and longterm benefits.
A skeptic might concur that custody decisionmaking would be
improved if the decision rule could allocate custody according to parental preference, but object that no legal rule can accomplish this goal.
Thus, the presumption underlying the best interests standard and the
joint custody rule, that both parents value custody equally, is as sound as
any other, although perhaps often inaccurate.11 2 This response, however,
neglects the key significance of past parental roles in shaping preference
for custody. In Part II, I argued that the best gauge of the value each
parent places on custody is that parent's role in the child's life during
marriage, a contention that is supported both by empirical evidence and
by common sense. 1 3 To be sure, past parenting roles will not accurately
reflect each parent's preference for custody in every case. Some parents
genuinely prefer more or less custody than their prior relationship would
indicate. But if, in general, parents' roles in the intact family more accurately reflect preferences about custody than alternative characterizations
(such as equal preference), then a corresponding decision rule will go far
to reduce bargaining costs and enhance the benefits of the process for the
family.

111. Robert Cooter has demonstrated that the Coase Theorem provides an incomplete account
of the implications for bargaining of the placement of legal entitlements because it optimistically
presumes that the parties will bargain to agreement. The theorem does not contemplate that because
of strategic behavior (or spite) the parties might not reach agreement. In this situation, Cooter
argues, the law's function should be to minimize the costs of strategic behavior and bargaining
breakdown. See Cooter, supra note 91, at 17-20.
112. This presumption does not, of course, apply to a primary caretaker rule.
113. See supra Section II.A.2.

1992]

CHILD CUSTODY

C. The Effects of Alternative Decision Rules on Custody Bargaining
1.

ParentalPreference and BargainingUnder Alternative Rules

If predivorce roles are the best indicators of parental preference for
custody, then conventional custody frameworks distort parental preference. The best interests standard and the rule favoring joint custody err
in presuming that parents generally have equal preferences for custody.11 4 In contrast, a primary caretaker preference generally offers to
one parent more time and responsibility than she prefers and diminishes
the role of the secondary caretaker parent to that of a "visitor," offering
to him less time and responsibility than he might prefer.
If the background rule distorts parents' preferences, the process and
outcome of bargaining can be affected in several undesirable ways. In the
process of reassigning entitlements in the unstable bargaining setting,
even parties who are initially inclined toward cooperative settlement can
impose costs on one another that lead to conflict and noncooperation.
When parents are motivated to exchange custody rights for property to
achieve a satisfactory custody outcome, zero-sum features of the negotiation become more prominent because both parties presumably would like
a settlement that maximizes property holdings. Moreover, such an
exchange will result in an unequal property distribution-an outcome
that usually threatens the child's future economic welfare.
Because conventional rules misconstrue parental preference for custody, they promote strategic and spiteful behavior by any party who
receives a "windfall" legal entitlement that exceeds his preference. For
example, consider the effect of a rule that presumes that the parties have
an equal preference for custody on the negotiations between a primary
caretaker and her husband. These parties, who have asymmetrical preferences for custody, will also have asymmetrical stakes in a prospective
adjudication. The husband, who values custody less, will have less to
lose than the wife if negotiations break down and custody is resolved by
litigation."
This is because what is at stake--each parent's relationship
with the child-represents a more modest investment for the husband
than for the wife. In contrast, for the wife, successful litigation means
114. Although the formal best interests rule announces that both parents have an equal claim to
custody, the courts applying that standard probably continue to favor mothers. See supra Part I.
Under a joint custody rule, parents have equal claims to 50% custody. For a discussion of empirical
data indicating that mothers typically have primary responsibility for child care, and thus are more
likely to desire custody than are fathers, see infra Section W.A.l.b.
115. Note that this response is not based on psychological risk aversion contemplating an
uncertain outcome but on an assessment of the predicted utility of adjudication versus settlement.
The certainty of the rule should not affect the response. For example, a primary caretaker father
would respond in this way under a clear rule favoring mothers. See infra text accompanying notes
125-26. Observers have generally attributed this reluctance to litigate custody to risk-aversion in the
face of uncertainty. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 84, at 950.
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continuing a substantially similar relationship with her child-a modest
gain over her existing entitlement.' 16 The husband, on the other hand,
anticipates a significant gain from his ex ante position should he win
through adjudication. He will possess a valuable legal right, measured by
the extent to which the entitlement exceeds his preferred amount of custody, which he can later trade to the wife who values it more.' 17 Thus,
the expected payoff for winning and losing in court is different for each
parent. This imbalance confers a significant strategic advantage on the
father, increasing the temptation to engage in threats, bluffs, and holdout behavior."1 ' Moreover, if he is inclined to behave spitefully, the legal
advantage provides the opportunity for punishing his spouse.
The approximation framework is superior to conventional
frameworks as a background bargaining rule because it distributes entitlements to custody in a way that is more likely to track parental preferences. There is less likelihood of an asymmetry in the parties' choices
between litigation and settlement. Although they have different stakes in
custody, the rule directs an outcome that mirrors that difference. For
this reason, the framework encourages cooperative negotiations and discourages strategic or spiteful behavior, thus enhancing the possibility
that parties will reach a cooperative agreement about custody independent of their bargaining over property rights.
2. Precision as a Measure of Background BargainingRules
Another important, and more conventional, measure of the usefulness of different legal formulations as background rules for bargaining is
precision."' A precise rule promotes successful bargaining because it
suggests an obvious basis for agreement-some apparent solution to the
parties' differences that can be distinguished from a continuum of possibilities. 2 Such a rule serves this function by signalling clearly the outcome of adjudication, thus encouraging settlement and thereby reducing
bargaining costs. A bright-line rule favoring joint custody, for example,
116. For a primary caretaker mother, successful litigation under a joint custody rule means
obtaining exclusive custody by persuading a judge that joint custody is detrimental to the child's
welfare.
117. "Excess" custody could be a loss to the father, of course, if he were unable to trade it to the
mother. As long as she wants custody, however, the entitlement will be valuable to him.
118. If this couple bargains under a joint custody rule, the magnitude of the loss and gain that
each spouse contemplates is less dramatic. In this framework, however, the asymmetrical stakes
make adjudication even less attractive for the wife because her loss and the husband's gain are more
certain.
119. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 84, at 978-80.
120. Thomas Schelling argues that the challenge for bargaining is to coordinate expectations.
This coordination is facilitated if there is some focus for agreement or suggestion contained in the
situation itself. Examples of this phenomenon include the tendency of bargains to express outcomes
in round numbers, to split the difference, to look to precedent, and to agree to a 50/50 division.
SCHELLING, supra note 85, at 67-74.
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encourages parties bargaining in its shadow to agree to joint custody. In

contrast, a broad standard, because it offers little guidance to bargaining
parties about the probable judicial resolution of the dispute, does little to
facilitate agreement. Much criticism of the best interests standard has
focused on this deficiency. 12 1 Because the outcome of adjudication is
uncertain, the standard encourages strategic behavior and prolongs negotiation. Its imprecision contributes to increased bargaining costs and to
the risk of uncooperative outcomes or bargaining failure.

An imprecise rule such as the best interests standard imposes particularly heavy costs on the party who is more risk-averse about the outcome of adjudication. If divorcing spouses have asymmetrical stakes in
the outcome, they might also differ in their risk aversion. The party who
has a greater stake in continuing her parenting relationship might be
more reluctant than her spouse to subject the custody decision to the
uncertainty of judicial determination even if she actually faces a smaller
risk of losing custody than does her spouse.122 Research findings indicate
that decisionmakers anchor choices in the status quo and tend to be riskaverse about protecting existing endowments. Moreover, losses loom
larger than gains when both are equally likely. Therefore, individuals
will weigh the loss of an existing endowment more heavily than foregone
gains of equal expected value.1 23 A primary caretaker parent contemplating litigation under the best interests standard might see the risk as
the loss of an existing endowment-the relationship with the child. The
less involved parent, on the other hand, might perceive adjudication of
custody as an opportunity to gain a new endowment. Thus, he is likely
121. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 84, at 977-80. The best interests standard
announces that any relevant variable can determine outcome, and thus provides little guidance.
122. Even though the actual risk that mothers will lose custody is surely less than 50%, the
uncertainty of outcome combined with the magnitude of the loss makes it appear greater than it is.
123. This response is known as the "endowment effect," a theory developed by Richard Thaler
to describe the inertia introduced into the consumer-choice process because people place a relatively
high value on things they already possess-their endowments. Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive
Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. EcON. BEHAV. & ORGANizATIOo 39, 44 (1980); see also Richard
H. Thaler, Illusions and Mirages in Public Policy, PuB. INTERESr, Fall 1983, at 60, 64 (discussing
empirical evidence supporting the endowment effect theory). The endowment effect is based on
"prospect theory," which posits that decisionmakers evaluating gains and losses systematically
deviate from ideals of rational choice because they view "outcomes as gains and losses, rather than as
final states of wealth or welfare." Daniel Kahmemann & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRiCA 263, 274 (1979). This behavior is contrary to
that predicted by rational choice theory-that choices are made so as to maximize aggregate utility.
See id. at 277-80; see also Daniel Kahnemann & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39
AM. PSYCHOLOGisT 341, 343-44 (1984); Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual
Decisionmaking:An Essay on the RelationshipBetween Cognitive Illusions and the Management of
Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 329 (1986) (discussing prospect theory in light ofthe endowment effect);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahnemann, The Framing ofDecisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211
SCIENCE 453 (1981) (examining subjects' evaluations of choices and concluding that the manner in
which a choice is presented (as a loss or a gain) will affect the perceived risk).
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to view the prospect of litigation more affirmatively 12 4 -a psychological
stance that conveys a strategic advantage. In practice, this bargaining
dynamic is likely to exaggerate the skew toward unequal economic settlement, disadvantaging mothers and, ultimately, children. Thus, the psychological response of loss aversion combines with the realistic
assessment of asymmetrical stakes in the outcome to reinforce the tendency of mothers facing adjudication under the best interests standard to
settle out of court.
Although a precise custody formulation will generally function better than a broad standard in reducing bargaining costs, the benefit will be
lost unless the rule also reflects parental preference for custody. Parties
bargaining in the shadow of a precise rule that distorts their preferences
will either exchange entitlements to reach a satisfactory agreement or
agree to an arrangement that reflects the rule but not their preferences. I
have described the costs of the former response. The latter can be just as
costly. For example, a couple bargaining under a joint custody presumption might agree grudgingly to joint custody because of a reluctance to
exchange assets, a lack of assets to exchange, or because they conclude
that they can tolerate the arrangement. If this happens, the negotiated
arrangement can be unstable, leading to relitigation, withdrawal from the
custody relationship,12 5 or "drift" to a more satisfactory arrangement. 126
The approximation framework will function better than the conventional alternatives as a background rule for custody negotiation because
it offers maximum precision with minimal distortion of parental preference. To be sure, this approach offers a less precise guide to bargainers
than would a bright-line joint custody preference, both because of the
somewhat complex inquiry and because of the range of possible out124. Moreover, the less risk-averse party might be more optimistic about the outcome of
litigation, which can contribute to the breakdown of bargaining. Cf RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 434-40 (2d ed. 1977) (arguing that a dispute is more likely to be
resolved by litigation if both parties are optimistic about the outcome); John P. Gould, The
EconomicsofLegal Conflicts 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973) (arguing that risk preferrers will gamble,
that is, will go to court). Uncertainty in the background rule could promote optimism in the party
who has less to lose.
125. Fathers in traditional arrangements often withdraw from the relationship with their
children, in part out of dissatisfaction with their minimal role as "visitors." See supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
126. These parents, for the reasons suggested, might agree to joint custody and later implicitly
acknowledge their preferences through their conduct. See Mnookin et al., supra note 34, at 65-67
(comparing legal outcomes with children's actual residence patterns). If this were routine and
predictable, the primary parent could avoid bargaining costs by agreeing to joint custody, knowing
that eventually the preferred arrangement would emerge. However, uncertainty about this outcome,
because of spite or conflict generated by the unaccustomed roles, will reduce its impact on
bargaining. The conflict generated by hostile bargaining or litigation may impede the natural course
of role realignment.
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comes.127 As experience with joint custody suggests, however, greater
precision has a cost. 128 Given the variety among families, a clear rule
preferring any one custody arrangement will promote an outcome that

distorts many parents' preferences. The relative complexity and imprecision of the approximation inquiry is necessary to promote satisfactory
arrangements. At the same time, this framework is considerably more
precise than the best interests standard, substantially narrowing the
inquiry and more clearly signalling the outcome of adjudication.
Ultimately, the effects of imprecision under the approximation
framework are likely to be modest. A court might err in measuring the
prior parental role but is unlikely to deprive an involved parent of custody altogether, as can happen under the best interests standard. Thus,
the magnitude of the prospective loss associated with litigation is lessened, and the impact on bargaining of risk aversion will be moderate.
3. Bargainingand Substantive Custody Goals
I return from a different vantage to a theme introduced at the beginning of this Part-the interdependence of custody bargaining and the
substantive goals of custody law. An adequate custody rule both
expresses the law's substantive policy goal of facilitating arrangements
that are beneficial to children and functions as a background rule that
encourages cooperative settlement with minimal costs. Current legal
frameworks are inadequate because they fail in one regard or the other.
A clear joint custody rule serves as an efficient bargaining rule in some
regards, but it may tend to promote unsuitable custody arrangements,
thus distorting the law's policy goal. The best interests standard, on the
other hand, accurately mirrors the law's policy goal, in theory. In practice, however, its serious deficiency as a background bargaining rule
severely impedes the capacity of the best interests standard to accomplish
the substantive goal-custody arrangements that promote the child's
welfare. The approximation standard is more likely than is either conventional rule to function satisfactorily in both respects. This framework
extracts from the multivariate, discretionary best interests standard the
factor that best predicts successful custody arrangements. In this way it
offers greater guidance as a background bargaining rule than the best
interests standard. At the same time, it signals adjudication outcomes to
bargainers and only distorts the law's policy goal when custody based on
127. For a discussion of the inquiry under the approximation framework, see supra text
accompanying notes 76-77.
128. In general, because of its simplicity, a precise background rule will tend to distort the law's
policy goals. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 3, at 462-64. See generally Isaac Ehrlich & Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) (contrasting
the costs associated with clear rules with those associated with broad standards).
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prior parental roles is not the arrangement that reflects the child's best
interests.
IV
THE INFLUENCE OF CUSTODY LAW ON THE EVOLUTION

OF GENDER NORMs
Legal rules can be examined not only in terms of their efficiency in
resolving disputes between parties, but more broadly as expressions of
societal values and instruments of social change. In this Part, I will look
at custody law in this light. Some scholars have argued that custody law
could facilitate a transformation of gender role ideology by encouraging
spouses to share domestic and employment roles. Katharine Bartlett and
Carol Stack, for example, argue that a joint custody preference will promote desirable ideological and attitudinal change by expressing commitment to egalitarian norms. 12 9 I am sympathetic to this goal but skeptical
that the legal tool of custody law can accomplish the task. Such optimism fails to account adequately for the continuing pervasive
influence
of preexisting roles on attitudes, behavior, and the character of family
relations. Moreover, in general, the law functions ineffectively in the regulation of intricate ongoing family relationships. Thus, a joint custody
rule, which seeks to reform the ideology of gender roles by directing
reluctant parents to share responsibility for their children, is likely to
disappoint expectations. On the issue of custody, the reformative potential of the law is limited to supporting parents who have shared responsibility during marriage and signalling that an investment in parenting will
not be lost.
A.

The Process of Family Role Change

I do not want to review extensively the familiar arguments favoring
the egalitarian restructuring of family roles. Although some controversy
continues to surround this issue, few would dispute that traditional
parental roles, and the resulting economic dependence of women on men,
are maladaptive in a world in which a substantial percentage of marriages end in divorce. 3 The trend toward interchangeable work and
family roles offers the promise of greater economic security for women
129. Bartlett and Stack argue that the symbolic expressive function of law influences ideological
change. Drawing on the analogy to civil rights law, they suggest that the law can compel certain
behavior, which then becomes institutionalized and routine, eventually effecting attitudinal and
normative change in those initially resistant to the law. See Bartlett & Stack, supra note 9, at 28-35.
130. A great deal has been written about the economic disabilities of divorced women,
particularly those with children. See, eg., EMERY, supra note 45, at 126-27 ("Women who enter or
re-enter the workforce after divorce have sacrificed earning potential by assuming the homemaker
role," id. at 126); LEONORE 3. WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 323-29 (1985) ("For most

women and children, divorce means precipitous downward mobility," id. at 323).
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and children;13 1 it also improves the prospects for a stronger paternal
presence after divorce. Moreover, egalitarian parental roles offer numerous intangible benefits.13 2 By challenging categories that define particular human qualities and functions by gender, interchangeable roles
expand the range of experience of both men and women.' 3 3 Advocates
might argue that a joint custody preference could promote desirable
changes in gender ideology by conveying a symbolic message about how
men and women should participate in their children's lives.' 34 This
131. If women and men left marriage with comparable work experience and earning capacity,
much of the economic hardship that custodial mothers and their children now experience would be
alleviated. Currently available remedies designed to compensate upon divorce for the disparity in
earning capacity between men and women are conceded to be inadequate, and no corrective measure
is likely to be very satisfactory. At the heart of the problem is an unexamined value conflict in
divorce policy. In theory, divorce law seeks to protect the dependent wife from economic harm
incurred because she fulfilled her expected maternal role. Burdening the husband with onerous
support obligations, however, conflicts with the modern legal norm that endorses each spouse's
freedom to end the marriage and pursue fulfillment through other relationships.
132. Studies have found that women who fill multiple roles experience greater satisfaction than
women whose full-time occupation is working in the home and caring for children. See JEssIE
BARNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 46-47 (1982) (describing positive mental health effects of
work for married women); Cynthia F. Epstein, Toward a FamilyPolicy: Changes in Mothers' Lives,
in THE CHANGING AMERICAN FAMILY AND PUBLIC POLICY 157, 165-69 (Andrew J. Cherlin ed.,
1988) (women employed outside the home are likely to benefit psychologically from the experience if
the result is that they feel they have more control of their lives); Ronald C. Kessler & James A.
McRae, Jr., The Effect of Wives' Employment on the Mental Health ofMarriedMen and Women, 47
AM. Soc. REv. 216, 219-23 (1982) ("[E]mployment is associated with improved mental health
among women whose husbands share childcare," id at 220). But see Paul D. Cleary & David
Mechanic, Sex Differences in PsychologicalDistressAmong MarriedPeople, 24 J. HEALTH & SOC.
BEHAV. 11, 116 (1983) (in households in which the mother works outside the home, a positive
correlation exists between depression in women and the number of minor children).
In a study of men and women law school graduates, David Chambers found that women who
have children and who accommodate career and family responsibilities reported greater satisfaction
in balancing their careers and families than did men. David L. Chambers, Accommodation and
Satisfaction: Women and Men Lawyers and the Balance of Work and Family, 14 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 251 (1989). This group of women were also more satisfied than career women without
children, suggesting that significant investment in both work and family roles might promote
maximum satisfaction. Id at 273-76. This may be true despite the fact that employed women are
also burdened with more domestic responsibilities than employed men. See JOSEPH H. PLECK,
WORKING WIVES/WORKING HUSBANDS 15 (1985). In addition, Chambers found that attorney
fathers, although not less satisfied with their work per se, were less satisfied than were attorney
mothers with the balance of their family and professional lives and generally expressed less overall
career satisfaction. Chambers, supra, at 273-76. Men were also far more likely to work in large law
firms, work settings which, although prestigious and financially rewarding, are also among the least
accommodating to participation in family life.
133. Joan Williams, in a persuasive critique of the perspective of "difference" feminism, has
argued that not only the functions but also the personal traits characterized as masculine and
feminine are shaped by socially constructed gender roles. Following this reasoning, there is no
reason to believe that fathers inherently have less capacity to nurture and to connect in relationships,
qualities that are culturally defined as feminine. Likewise, mothers can be powerful, competitive,
and independent, although these are currently viewed as predominately male traits. Williams, supra
note 36, at 840-43.
134. Bartlett and Stack, supra note 9, at 28 & n.92.
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expectation, however, underestimates the influence of entrenched gender
norms on individual behavior and attitudes. Recent changes in parental
roles have been more superficial than is apparent, and the sources of
resistance to more fundamental change are deep. Thus, efforts to effect
change through direct legal manipulation of family relationships will be
costly.
L

The ContinuingInfluence of TraditionalParentingNorms

On one level, the roles of men and women in marriage and in the
workplace have undergone extraordinary change in the past fifty
years.'3 5 Nonetheless, the magnitude of change should not be exaggerated. The current situation is most accurately described as a period of
normative pluralism in which no shared ideal defines family and work

roles. Attitudes fall along a continuum from those who continue to support traditional, highly differentiated gender roles as essential to family
welfare at one pole, to those who endorse fully interchangeable parental
roles at the other.13 6 Moreover, the movement of women into the
workforce sends a misleading signal about both attitudinal and behav-

ioral change. Indirect evidence indicates that men and women both still
regard a woman's maternal and domestic roles as central to her identity,

requiring subordination of other pursuits.'37 These attitudes are reflected
in practice; employed women continue to bear the primary responsibility
for rearing children. In general, traditional gender norms continue to
have a pervasive influence on behavior and attitudes, inhibiting movement toward shared family roles.
135. In 1940 only 9% of women with preschool children worked outside the home. See
Jacqelynne S. Eccles & Lois W. Hoffman, Sex Roles, Specialization and OccupationalBehavior, In 1
CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH AND SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 100, at 367, 368. By 1985 that
number had risen to 52%. Glenna Spitze, The Data on Women's Labor Force Participation,in
WOMEN WORKING 42, 44 (Ann H. Stromberg & Shirley Harkess eds., 2d ed. 1988).
As for women's preferences, a 1985 Roper poll reported that 45% of women interviewed would
prefer to stay home and care for the house and family, while 51% would prefer to work outside the
home. The Roper Org., 1985 Virginia Slims Survey 67. The percentage of women who would like to
be married with children and have a full-time job was 43% in 1987. 1987 Gallup Poll Survey 252G.
136. In general there has been a trend toward increasingly egalitarian attitudes about gender
roles. See generally Arland Thornton, Changing Attitudes Toward Family Issues in the United
States, 51 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 873 (1989). There is some evidence, however, that indicates that
both men and women express more egalitarian attitudes about gender than their behavior suggests.
See Sharon K. Araji, Husbands' and Wives' Attitude-Behavior Congruence on Family Roles, 39 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 309, 310 (1977) (with respect to husband-as-provider and wife-as-homemaker,
egalitarian role behavior lagged behind egalitarian role attitudes). The percentage of people who
endorse fully egalitarian roles is very small. PLECK, supra note 132, at 75-76.
137. See Rita J. Simon & Jean M. Landis, The Polls--A Report: Women's and Men's Attitudes
About a Woman's Place and Role, 53 PUB. OPINION Q. 265, 272 (1989) (a majority of those polled
answered that a woman should put marriage and family ahead of her career, including quitting her
job to relocate if her husband. gets a better job).
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Women in the Workplace

To a far greater degree than is true of men, women's occupational
choices and experience are shaped and restricted by their parental
responsibilities.13 8 Women are more likely to be employed in occupations that allow part-time work, intermittent commitment, and flexible
schedules,139 and thus, not surprisingly, are concentrated and segregated

in lower-status, lower-paying occupations."4 To be sure, many variables
contribute to this disparity between men and women besides differentiated parental roles. 1 ' Nevertheless, as long as the ideal worker is

modeled largely on the man without domestic responsibilities, women
who seek to accommodate work and family obligations will continue to

be limited to low-status, low-paying jobs. And it may well be true, as
Daniel Fischel and Edward Lazear argue, that women "voluntarily
choose lower-paying occupations."' 4 Clearly, however, the voluntari138. This explanation for the disadvantaged position of women in the labor market is based on
human capital theory, which posits that women, because of their domestic responsibilities, are less
able to compete with men in the workplace. See PATRIcIA A. Roos, GENDER AND WORK: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSiS OF INDUSTRAL SociETEs 3-5 (1985).
139. Eccles & Hoffman, supra note 135, at 375-76.
140. Women receive compensation (for full-time employment) at a rate of about 60-65% of that
received by men. This "wage gap" has been fairly constant for 40 years. Id. Although some
progress toward integration has been made since 1970, most men and women work in sex-segregated
jobs. See id.at 375.
141. Institutional explanations for sex segregation and discrimination focus on "tastes for
discrimination" by employers, employees, and customers, and on the lack of a competitive market.
Moreover, some observers argue that occupations in which women are concentrated (such as school
teachers and nurses), because of the mere fact that they employ mostly women, have lower wages
than other jobs requiring comparable or less skill and commitment that employ mostly men (such as
plumbers, construction workers, etc.). See Mary E. Becker, BarriersFacing Women in the WageLaborMarket and the Need for AdditionalRemedies: A Reply to Fischel and Lazear, 53 U. Ci. L.
REv. 934, 942 (1986). Discrimination against women based on sexual stereotyping might also be an
important factor explaining the wage differential. Women can be disadvantaged in hiring or
advancement either because they are perceived as lacking "masculine" characteristics (such as
assertiveness) deemed necessary for particular jobs or because they possess such characteristics and
are thus not feminine. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) ("An employer
who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an
intolerable and impermissible Catch-22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if
they do not."); Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of
Power, 41 HASTINS L.J. 471, 485 (1990). In blue-collar jobs, advancement can be impeded by
hostility from males. See Becker, supra, at 944. For a discussion of several barriers that women face
in the labor market, see generally id.at 940-47.
142. Daniel R. Fischel & Edward P. Lazear, Comparable Worth and Discriminationin Labor
Markets, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 891, 897 (1986). Fischel and Lazear argue that women might make
this choice because low-paying occupations have attributes that accommodate their desire to
specialize in childbearing, childrearing, and household services. Women might therefore choose jobs
that allow them to enter and exit without penalty and avoid occupations that require long hours,
relocation, or extensive training periods. In making this choice, however, women must "pay a price
in the form of lower wages." Id Becker challenges this analysis. See generally Becker, supra note
141. She points out that the gendered wage differential exists in occupations with comparable skills,
and that women whose employment is not intermittent are not much more likely to be in maledominated occupations. Moreover, Becker argues that Fisechel and Lazear ignore the importance of
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ness of the choice is constrained by societal norms, internalized by many
women, that women bear primary responsibility for their children's care
and that subordinating this duty to a career is deviant.14 3
b.

Gender Roles and Family Participation

The continuing tenacious influence of traditional gender norms on
attitudes and behavior challenges theories of family role allocation that
prevailed until recently. In the 1960s and 1970s, resource theory
explained husbands' minimal participation in the domestic sphere as a
function of occupational role and not of gender role ideology. 1" Contrary to the theory's prediction, however, the movement of wives into the
labor force has not resulted in a corresponding increase in the amount of
time fathers spend performing household tasks. 145 The failure of
the background gendered power structure for determining opportunities for men and women and
defining productivity. Becker also argues that women choose occupations based on internalized
gender ideology. Id at 940-44.
143. In 1985 more than half of the women responding to an attitudinal survey reported that
they believed that preschool children suffer when their mothers work. Thornton, supra note 136, at
876-77. Some child guidance experts and psychologists criticize mothers' employment when
children are young. See Jay Belskey, The "Effects" of Infant Day Care Reconsidered, 3 EARLY
CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 235, 265 (1988) (more than 20 hours a week of nonmaternal care during the
first year places child at risk); T. Berry Brazelton, Issues for Working Parents,in THE PARENTAL
LEAVE CRISIS 36, 39 (Edward F. Zigler & Meryl Frank eds., 1988) (describing harm of mothers'
premature return to work); see also infra note 164 (discussion of day care controversy). Cynthia
Epstein's research found that women who sought to invest in careers in male-dominated professions
met with disapproval, particularly if they were mothers. In her view, these women felt guilty
because they internalized the belief that they were selfish. See Epstein, supra note 132, at 165.
Epstein describes a "zero-sum perspective" that assumes that mothers' career satisfaction is achieved
at some cost to their children's well-being. Id. at 181.
144. Resource theory was developed by Blood and Wolfe who based it on a study of the division
of household tasks between husbands and wives. See ROBERT 0. BLOOD, JR. & DONALD M.
WOLFE, HUSBANDS & WIVES: THE DYNAMICS OF MARRIED LIVING (1960). Resource theory
posited that allocation of tasks within a family was based on different resources such as skills and
strength. See id. at 47-48. The chief resource required for domestic tasks is time; because women
who do not work outside the home usually have more time than their husbands, they tend to
perform the bulk of domestic tasks. Id. Blood and Wolfe concluded that husbands did a higher
proportion of housework in households in which wives worked than in those in which wives did not
work. Cf id at 62, 65-66 (finding that wives who worked performed a smaller proportion of
household tasks and concluding therefore that husbands must have performed a greater proportion
of domestic tasks).
Besides resource theory, exchange theory was also used to explain the gendered division of
labor. John Scanzoni argued that husbands often provide objective (status, prestige, and income)
and subjective (feelings of being a part of the opportunity structure) rewards to their wives in
exchange for household services and companionship. See JOHN H. SCANZONI, OPPORTUNITY AND
THE FAMILY 184 (1970).
145. Indeed, although the proportion of husbands' contributions to household chores is greater,
as Blood and Wolfe concluded, this increase results principally from working wives spending less
time, in absolute terms, performing household duties than nonworking wives. PLECK, supra note
132, at 31. According to Pleck, resource theory was discredited by several large-scale studies in the
1970s that showed that men did not increase their participation in housework and childcare greatly
when wives worked. Id. at 15. In fact, the total workload of employed wives substantially exceeded
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resource theory to provide an adequate account of differentiated family
roles indicates the continuing robust influence of traditional norms on

the institutions of the family and workplace.
Contemporary mothers and fathers differ both as to the quantity of

time spent in child care and in the character of the parent-child interaction. 146 In most cases, mothers perform the basic tasks of child care,

while fathers devote proportionately more time to "play" interaction. 47
More intangibly, mothers "manage" their children's lives by making
decisions, anticipating needs, and responding to problems.14 This is not

to suggest that the father-child relationship is unimportant to the child's
development.

49

In most families, however, including those in which

both parents are employed, mothers function as primary and fathers as
that of their husbands. Studies have found that employed wives work a total of 1.3 to 2.4 hours
more per day than their husbands. Id For a discussion of research on time studies of family and
paid work, see id at 27-54.
As men have become liberated from the "good provider" or "breadwinner" role over the past
several decades, two trends have emerged. See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Good Dads-Bad Dads
Two Facesof Fatherhood,in THE CHANGING AMERICAN FAMILY AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note
132, at 193, 198-200. Fathers in intact families have become somewhat more active participants in
the family. Id. at 199, 206-09. At the same time, many men have rejected the breadwinner role by
failing to pay child support after divorce. Id at 199-200, 202-03; see also Joseph H. Pleck,
Husbands' Paid Work and Family Roles: Current Research Issues, in 3 RESEARCH IN THE
INTERWEAVE OF SOCIAL ROLES: FAMILIES AND JOBS 251, 262-63 (Helena Z. Lopata & Joseph H.
Pleck eds., 1983) (some studies have shown that husbands' increased participation in childcare, as
opposed to other domestic tasks, has been modest).
146. In intact families, fathers participate little in routine caretaking tasks. One study found
that fathers in upper-middle and professional class families spent an average of 15 to 20 minutes a
day with their infant children. Peggy L. Ban & Michael Lewis, Mothers and Fathers,Girls andBoys:
Attachment Behavior in the One-Year-Old, 20 MERRILL-PALMER Q. 195, 202 (1974). For an
excellent review of relevant research, see Thompson, supra note 51, at 65 (citing numerous studies
about fathers' minimal participation). In most cases, mothers continue to perform most basic
caregiving tasks such as feeding, bathing, and preventative protection from harm. Id. at 66. For a
comprehensive discussion of this research, see Chambers, supra note 4, at 533-34.
147. Thompson, supra note 51, at 66, 72. By age two, children in studies preferred fathers for
play. See Jay Belsky, Mother-Father-InfantInteraction: A Naturalistic Observational Study, 15
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 601, 605-06 (1979) (infants are more likely to move toward and more
likely to vocalize and show things to their fathers); Thompson, supra note 51, at 69, 71-72 (infants
showed a more friendly, positive responsiveness to fathers than mothers). On the other hand, small
children turn to their mothers for comfort when tired, anxious, or otherwise stressed. See icL at 7072. This differential response suggests that the relationships young children have with their fathers
and mothers differ in their salience. See Michael E. Lamb, The Ddvelopment of Social Expectations
in the FirstYear of Life, in INFANT SOCIAL COGNrION (Michael E. Lamb & L. Sherrod eds., 1981).
148. See Furstenberg, supra note 145, at 209 (the father often serves as the "babysitter" rather
than the "orchestrator of the child's activities"). While arguing that fathers in two-parent families
usually play a central part in children's lives despite mediating factors, one commentator has
acknowledged that the father's relationship to the child is often mediated by the role of the mother.
See Chambers, supra note 4, at 535.
149. To the contrary, from an early age children demonstrate emotional attachment to their
fathers, who serve as role models and disciplinarians. See Chambers, supra note 4, at 534-35. In
addition to this emotional attachment, Thompson argues that fathers play an important part in the
intellectual development of their children. See Thompson, supra note 51, at 68-70, 72-73.
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secondary caregivers.' 5 °
2. Explaining the Slow Pace of Gender Role Change
Some feminists argue that the slow progress toward shared parental

roles represents an unambiguous effort by men to keep women in a
subordinated status.'
This account seems incomplete, however, in part
because it fails to explain for the resistance of women to the reformulation of traditional gender roles.' 52 Despite the apparent benefits, the proportion of women who fully subscribe to a goal of shared parental roles is
small.' 5 3 An examination of the nature of gender norms and of the complex forces that influence their evolution explains in part why change has
been slower and shallower than it appears and how the ambivalence of
both men and women contributes to the pace.
150. Thompson, supra note 51, at 66.
151. See Margaret Polatnick, Why Men Don't Rear Children:A Power Analysis, 18 BERKELEY
J. Soc. 45, 60-79 (1973). Some feminists also argue that men encourage women's financial
dependence, which reinforces their subordinated position. See, eg., id at 64. If women are
forbidden from working or bear primary responsibility for domestic tasks, they are disabled from
competing effectively for power and resources in society. See JOHN K. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS
AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE

58-60 (1973) (women doing household tasks are "crypto-servants"

performing menial personal tasks); Heidi I. Hartmann, The Family as the Locus of Gender, Class,
and PoliticalStruggle: The Example of Housework, 6 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & Soc'y 366, 385
(1981) (household labor by women confers patriarchal benefits upon men); Pat Mainardi, The
Politicsof Housework, in SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL 501 (Robin Morgan ed., 1970) (the allocation
of housework to women is a form of oppression or exploitation by men); Polatnick, supra, at 64
(allocating childrearing to women assures male domination of work world).
152. Moreover, some researchers argue that many men get less intrinsic satisfaction from their
work role than this critique suggests and that men view their work role primarily as a means of
fulfilling their breadwinner role. See, e.g., Daniel Yankelovich, The Meaning of Work, in THE
WORKER AND THE JOB 19, 44-45 (Jerome M. Rosow ed., 1974) (suggesting that only approximately
one-fifth of men find their psychological needs fulfilled by work).
153. Many women do not express a desire for husbands to contribute more to housework and
child care. See PLECK, supra note 132, at 33, 44-45, 90-92 (finding that women perform
substantially more domestic tasks than their husbands, but only about one third express a desire for
husbands to do more); Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and
Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1759, 1774 (1991) (suggesting that despite increasing
percentages of wives who want husbands to perform more domestic tasks, many women do not feel
that their disproportionate assumption of domestic responsibilities is unjust).
Large-scale surveys of family and work often include a few items about gender role attitudes
that are directed at assessing whether respondents reject traditionalism or not. As Pleck points out,
however, many such surveys fail to explore the extent to which fully egalitarian roles are embraced.
The reason for this is that in representative samples, most respondents reject egalitarian values.
PLECK, supra note 132, at 75. Thus, researchers omit such questions from their final questionnaires
because these items will yield little variation in response. Id. at 75-76.
The following are examples of the types of survey statements presented to respondents in studies
designed to measure changes in gender attitudes with which respondents were directed to express
their level of agreement: "'There is some work that is men's and some that is women's, and they
should not be doing each others'' "; "'Women are much happier if they stay at home and take care
of their children' "; "'The husband should make all important decisions in the family' "; "'It's
perfectly all right for women to be very active in clubs, politics, and other outside activities before
the children are grown up.'" Thornton, supra note 136, at 877 (table of survey questions).
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Gender roles are grounded in ascribed traits and are deeply rooted
in personal identity; thus, they are quite resistant to change. 154 From
infancy onward, men and women are exposed continuously to differentiated societal expectations based on sex.' 55 These expectations are institu-

tionalized as societal norms and become internalized in both men and
women."

6

Although the message is surely softened in the modem con-

text, female children continue to absorb from society that self-fulfillment
is found first through marriage and motherhood, while for male children

self-fulfillment is more often equated with success in the broader world
beyond the family.' 57
Sociological theory posits that maintenance of differentiated gender

roles depends on evidence or belief that differentiation is either natural or
efficient.'

s

Some economists have argued that differentiated family and

work roles represent an efficient division of labor, and thus maximize
family welfare.' 5 9 This rationale, although it may sometimes support
154.

For a sociological discussion of theories of gender role differentiation and stratification

(hierarchy), see HARRIET HOLTER, SEX ROLES AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1970). Holter points out
that gender role differences have been found in every society. Id. at 18. She emphasizes the
importance of the ascribed character of gender roles and contrasts this feature with role
differentiation based on achievement. Id at 19-23. Mobility to other social positions is far easier
when role differentiation is based on performance and preference. Ia at 19-20. Holter reports that
sociologists have had little interest in norms based on ascribed criteria. Id at 20.
155. See infra note 157.
156. See HoLTER, supranote 154, at 41-42. Gender role norms are reinforced through primary
and secondary rewards. Primary rewards include social approval received by conforming to gender
role expectations. Id at 34-35. For example, boys (more than girls) receive approval for acting
assertively. Secondary rewards are more indirect responses. Thus, assertive boys might gain
leadership positions. See iL
157. For example, parents have different expectations for sons and daughters. Parents are more
likely to emphasize achievement and competition with sons than with daughters. Jeanne H. Block,
Another Look at Sex Differentiation in the SocializationBehaviors of Mothers and Fathers, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN: FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH 29, 74-75 (Julia A. Sherman &
Florence L. Denmark eds., 1978). Parents therefore probably have greater career and academic
expectations for sons than daughters. In addition, different qualities are valued in sons and
daughters. Parents are more likely to describe success, ambition, and intelligence as qualities they
want sons to develop, while they are more likely to hope daughters will be kind, attractive, wellmannered, and will have a good marriage. See Eccles & Hoffmann, supra note 135, at 391-93.
Other influences on gender role development that reinforce differentiation include television, school
experience, and athletic programs. See generally id at 393-407.
158. See HOLTER, supra note 154, at 21. The belief that differentiation is natural presumes that
two groups differ in inborn capacities. This, of course, often reinforces differentiation based on
efficiency. Differentiated roles can also be sustained if supported by a belief that they are divinely
ordained. See id Such beliefs, although once important in supporting gender roles, are less
influential today. Indeed, the secularization of gender role differentiation has been important in
weakening ascribed roles. Ia at 22.

159. See, e.g.,

GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 108

(1976) ("Members who are relatively more efficient at market activities would use less of their time
at consumption activities than would other members."). But see Richard A. Berk, The New Home
Economics" An Agenda for Sociological Research, in WOMEN AND HOUSEHOLD LABOR 113, 124-25
(Sarah F. Berk ed., 1980) (pointing out anomalies in Becker's argument).
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dividing domestic and employment roles between spouses, 160 does not

explain a pattern of systematically assigning primary domestic responsibilities to women and financial support obligations to men. The deeper,

more entrenched claim is that men and women have different characteristics and competencies that make differentiated gender roles efficient.
Stereotypical beliefs about male aggressiveness, competitiveness, and
161
rationality continue to support male dominance in the workplace.
Similarly, an implicit belief that women have a special capacity for nurturing persists, shaping attitudes and behavior of both men and women.
Today, women continue to receive and internalize many societal sig-

nals that children need primary care from their mothers. 162 Attachment

theory, which emphasizes the mother-child relationship as crucial to
healthy child development, continues to influence popular culture,
although its scientific basis has eroded. 163 Further, the ongoing controversy over day care focuses on whether substitutes for maternal care are
160. The gender-based allocation of tasks in dual career families might be perceived as efficient
if the husband's freedom to pursue career objectives maximized benefits for the whole family.
Another efficiency argument against shared parenting roles is that restructuring the family by
"retraining" fathers to perform child care and domestic functions will be costly to familial wellbeing. See HOLTER, supra note 154, at 28-30; see also PLECK, supra note 132, at 92 (suggesting that
wives might not want husbands to perform more child care because of difficulties that might arise in
training them to perform tasks competently). One challenge to this argument is that general
productivity would increase if women were more fully employed. See HOLTER, supra note 154, at
29-30.
161. Those kinds of stereotypical beliefs about gender roles can hurt women in the workplace in
two ways. First, wojnen can be discriminated against because they fail to exhibit feminine gender
traits. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). For example, the plaintiff female
employee who was denied partnership in Price Waterhouse was described by partners as" 'macho,'"
as " 'overcompensat[ing] for being a woman,' "and as needing" 'a course at charm school.'" Id. at
235 (quoting Defendant's Exhibit 27-31). Second, women can also be disadvantaged because of a
belief that they do exhibit stereotypical gender traits that are not desirable. Cf. EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). Sears
successfully defended against a Title VII discrimination claim for failing to hire female applicants for
commission sales jobs on the same basis as male applicants. Sears had argued that surveyed women
employees lacked interest in high-paying competitive commission sales jobs, preferring limited work
commitment in a supportive environment so that they could fulfill domestic responsibilities. Id. at
1305-15. For an insightful discussion of the Sears case, see Williams, supra note 36, at 813-21
(arguing that Sears used gender stereotypes to defend against the Title VII claim).
162. See supranote 143 (describing attitudes toward maternal responsibility). Evidence of these
signals and their power is contained in findings of research about noncustodial mothers. Fischer
found that noncustodial mothers were viewed as uncommon and met with significant societal
disapproval (exceeded only by homosexual couples) in evaluations by faculty and graduate students.
See Fischer, supra note 59, at 351-52.
163. See supra note 47 (overview of attachment theory). The research by Bowlby and
Ainsworth and others that formed the basis for this theory involved studies of mothers and children,
and hence the theory is delimited by this relationship. More recently, however, some researchers
have focused on the father-child relationship; as I have suggested, there is growing recognition of the
integral importance of this relationship to healthy child development. See supra notes 51, 147-49.
Moreover, the traditional view that mothering is a "natural" function for women grounded in
biology is less commonly held today. See Rhode, supra note 153, at 1747-49, 1784-85. Some believe
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Many working
detrimental to children's psychological growth.'
women experience ambivalence about their reduced availability to their
children, reflecting a common belief that mothers have a special,
nonfungible ability to meet their children's needs. 6 ' This belief surely
their career choices to the
influences many women to accommodate
66
demands of the maternal role.1
Women might also embrace their ascribed role because the intrinsic
value of the childrearing function obscures their subordinated status.167
Indeed, having been assigned this important societal function, women
might be inclined to assert a territorial claim, resisting the notion that
men can readily step into the role.' 61 If the obligations and functions
instead that women's competency and aptitude for mothering reflect culturally constructed gender
roles. See id. at 1785. As gender roles converge, men's nurturing "instincts" might be enhanced.
There is no evidence that men are inherently less competent at parenting than women. See
Furstenberg, supra note 145, at 206 (mothers' unique parenting capabilities have not been
substantiated). Men who assume primary caretaker roles function capably and are not disabled by
their gender. Id. Some psychologists believe that having two primary caretaker parents is beneficial
to children, as it provides a richer family experience with two adult role models and companions and
offers stability and continuity of care even in the ongoing marriage. See Lamb, supra note 47, at 3233. Evidence of the continued popular interest in attachment theory, however, is suggested by a
recent cover story in a popular magazine. Robert Karen, Becoming Attached, ATLANTIc
MONTHLY, Feb. 1990, at 35.
164. The debate about infant day care divides those who interpret the research findings to show
that infants in day care face an increased risk of emotional insecurity and social maladjustment and
those who hold that the data do not support these claims and that other variables such as family
characteristics or maternal responses are determinative. Compare Peter Barglow et al., Effects of
MaternalAbsence Due to Employment on the Quality of Infant-Mother Attachment in a Low-Risk
Sample, 58 CHILD DEv. 945 (1987) (infant day care creates risk of insecure infant-mother
attachment) and Belsky, supra note 143, at 257 (more than 20 hours per week of nonmaternal care
in the first year places child at risk of insecurity in infancy and adjustment problems in the preschool
and early school years) with K. Alison Clarke-Stewart, "The 'Effects' of Infant Day Care
Reconsidered" Reconsidered: Risks for Parents, Children, and Researchers, 3 EARLY CHILDHOOD
REs. Q. 293 (1988) (arguing that Belsky's data do not provide clear evidence that day care places
infants at risk of emotional maladjustment) and Deborah Philips et al., Select Review ofInfant Day
Care Research: A Cause for Concern!, ZERO TO THREE, Feb. 1987, at 18 (arguing that Belsky
selectively employs research findings). Interestingly, one measure of the detriment to infants in day
care is the extent to which such care disrupts attachment to the mother (suggesting the primacy of
the mother-child relationship). For an excellent discussion of the controversy surrounding the
research assessing infants' relationships with their mothers, see K. Alison Clarke-Stewart, Infant
Day Care: Maligned or Malignant?,44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 266 (1989).
165. Brazelton describes how working mothers of infants feel a sense of loss and competition
with substitute caregivers. Brazelton, supra note 143, at 46.
166. See Williams, supra note 36, at 823, 833 (women continue to marginalize themselves
economically in order to fulfill child care responsibilities through part-time work, "'sequencing,'"
the "'mommy track,'" or "'women's work' ").
167. See Rhode, supra note 153, at 1774 ("Since many women also believe that caring for a
home and children are their most rewarding pursuits, their disproportionate assumption of domestic
burdens may not always feel unjust.").
168. For a discussion of relevant research, see supra note 153. Berk found that both husbands
and wives expect wives to assume a large share of family work and that both are satisfied with the
division of household labor. SARAH F. BERK, THE GENDER FACTORY: THE APPORTIONMENT OF
WORK IN AMERICAN HOUSEHOLDS 207 (1985); see also Rhode, supra note 153, at 1774 (women
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that have long defined women's identity can be readily performed by
their male mates, then the unique character of the maternal role and of

women's special competency becomes uncertain. This response might be
reinforced by women's restricted access to power and resources in the
1 69
broader society.
Women do not seek more aggressively to discard ascribed gender
roles for another reason. Although they are disadvantaged relative to

men in terms of power and resources, this disparity is obscured by the
fact that many women live intimately with men and share the social sta-

tus and resources of their mates. In comparison to victims of racial hierarchy, women's exclusion is often indirect and muted-as long as they
are married. Thus, the disadvantage associated with differentiated gen-

der roles may generate dissatisfaction only upon divorce. Until then,
such roles can seem to be an efficient (and normatively desirable) allocation of labor. 17 0
Men are also ambivalent about shared family roles. 17 1 On the one
hand, men living in intimate relationships with women presumably care
about their mates' happiness, and if women desire fulfillment beyond the
domestic sphere, many men are likely to respond supportively. Moreover, as men become more confident about their nurturing capacities,

they may be motivated to invest in parenthood beyond the traditional
boundaries of the father's role. On the other hand, men might have an

incentive to maintain traditional roles because gender equality threatens
male power, status, and autonomy. Moreover, pressure to succeed in
socially defined masculine roles may reinforce men's resistance to
72
accepting a larger domestic role.1
might not think that it is unfair that they assume a disproportionate amount of domestic
responsibilities). Epstein points out that mothers' sex-role attitudes play a "gatekeeping" role that
can facilitate or discourage fathers' increased participation in domestic tasks. See Epstein, supra note
132, at 173. The proportion of wives who desire greater assistance from their husbands in domestic
work has steadily increased in recent years, but continues to be a minority position. PLECK, supra
note 132, at 90.
169. See Rhode, supra note 153, at 1751-55, 1764 (discussing gender bias in academic and
employment settings).
170. See supra notes 159-60, 168 and accompanying text (satisfaction in division of roles).
171. See Rhode, supra note 153, at 1772. Rhode states that "too many men view rhetorical
support for women's aspirations as an adequate substitute for more tangible personal and political
commitments." Id Further, "the skewed allocation of domestic responsibilities reveals wide
disparities between many husbands' professed principles and daily practices.... [Miany husbands
find ways to deny or rationalize their lighter burden." Id.
172. See Benson Rosen & Thomas H. Jerdee, Influence of Sex Role Stereotypes on Personnel
Decisions, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 9, 9 (1974) (arguing that men are expected to pursue their
careers with single-minded dedication). The occupational success of men might be threatened by
additional domestic responsibilities because any intrusion of family or other personal matters is
viewed unfavorably by employers. Id. A social psychology study of sex role stereotyping found that
employers, presented with hypotheticals, were less sympathetic to male accountants' requests for
leave to care for small children than they were to requests by female accountants. Id. at 12-13. In
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The implication of these observations for custody policy is important and has gone largely unheeded. Those who argue that custody law
can effectively promote fundamental change in the allocation of parenting responsibilities discount the formidable character of resistance by
both men and women to gender role change. To be sure, as sociological
theory predicts, ascribed gender roles are slowly changing and converging as the efficiency rationale supporting role differentiation loses
strength. On one level, many women recognize their exclusion from the
power and resources of society and are motivated to pursue avenues of
self-fulfillment beyond the family. Many forces work to slow the movement toward the convergence of parental roles, however, including the
continuing inclination of modem women to internalize conventional
societal norms defining the maternal role.
B. Social Norms and the Regulation of Family Relationships: The
Fallacy of Legal Centralism
It is evident that legal policy initiatives to promote the convergence
of gender roles face a formidable challenge. 73 Nonetheless, in the public
sphere there is reason to believe that regulation can eventually lower barriers to full participation by women in education and employment, and
influence the culture of the workplace toward one that presumes that
most workers, male and female, have significant family responsibilities.
Relationships within the family are far less amenable to legal monitor-

ing,174 however, and regulatory initiatives that seek directly to alter fain-

addition, some men might still believe that if they fill their breadwinner role adequately, their wives
should not have to work. See Furstenberg, supra note 145, at 195-98 (discussing the rise and decline
of the "good provider" role). In general, men do not differ significantly from women in their
attitudes towards men's increased participation in family work. PLECK, supra note 132, at 81.
The experience of the Swedish parental leave policy, designed in part to increase fathers'
parental participation, suggests how formidable male resistance can be. The Swedish government, in
1974, initiated a policy of offering parents several months of paid leave around the time of a child's
birth. Michael E. Lamb & James A. Levine, The Swedish ParentalInsurancePolicy: An Experiment
in Social Engineering,in FATHERHOOD AND FAMILY PoLICY, supra note 51, at 39. Fathers seldom
took advantage of the opportunity to stay home with their young children. Id. at 43-47. One study
showed that less than 10% of fathers took even one day of paid parental leave. Id. at 45. One
explanation might be fear of employer disapproval. Some anecdotal evidence appears to support this
hypothesis. Id. at 49-50.
173. The struggle in this country to combat racial discrimination suggests the enormity of the
task of breaking down norms based on ascribed traits. Even though the underlying values and
norms supporting racial equality have substantial support in our society, legal mechanisms to
combat racial discrimination have had, at best, modest success.
174. Although legal reforms dealing with employment, education, and other public spheres
might meet with substantial resistance, these settings are more amenable to legal monitoring because
they are public and because individuals and institutions are more likely than are family members to
be in arm's length relationships. Cf Lon L. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, in THE RULE
OF LAw 171, 212 (Robert P. Wolff ed., 1971) ("[T]he very qualities of enacted law that make it an
inept instrument for regulating intimate relations are precisely those which lend to it a special
capacity to put in order men's interactions within the larger impersonal society.").
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fly roles are likely to be more costly and less satisfactory than efforts in
the public sphere.
Scholars have increasingly expressed skepticism about the efficacy of
legal regulation of the family and other informal long-term relationships.
Robert Ellickson and others have argued persuasively that legal centralism, a construct that asserts the preemptive role of the state as a source of
social control, ignores the powerful regulatory function of informal social
norms that define appropriate behavior and form the basis of expectations in ongoing social relationships.1 75 Researchers have found that
relationships between neighbors,1 76 employers and servants, 177 and business persons and customers 178 are regulated largely by informal norms.
For this reason, such relationships may be relatively impervious to efforts
79
of legal reformation. 1
Legal regulation might be particularly ineffective in regulating relationships among family members, whose interactions involve an intricate
pattern of exchanges, decisions, assignments of tasks, and spheres of
authority that is shaped by preferences, values, and external pressures.
175. See Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social
Control, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 81-90 (1987). Economist Oliver Williamson first used the term
"legal centralism" to describe a belief that Ellickson attributes to law and economics scholars. See
id at 81. Although some sociologists have focused on law as the principal mechanism of social
control, many have recognized its peripheral role in resolving conflicts between intimates. See, e.g.,
Donald Black, Social Control as a Dependent Variable, in 1 TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF
SOCIAL CONTROL: FUNDAMENTALS 1, 3 (Donald Black ed., 1984) (people who have close
relationships use little law against one another). In his own empirical study of the resolution of
disputes between ranchers and farmers regarding trespassing cattle, Ellickson found that disputes
were resolved with little reference to the parties' substantive legal rights. See Robert C. Ellickson,
Of Coase and Cattle7 Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623,
671-86 (1986) [hereinafter Ellickson, Coase and Cattle]. Rather, parties adhered to informal social
norms that dictated responsibilities. Id.; see also Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperationin LongTerm Contracts, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 2005, 2040-42 (1987) (discussing social norms such as
reciprocity, honesty, trust, and solidarity that play important roles in regulating seller-buyer
contractual relationships).
176. See, eg., Ellickson, Coase and Cattle, supra note 175, at 671-85.
177. Sea eg., Vilhem Aubert, Some Social FunctionsofLegislation, 10 AcTA SOClOLOGICA 98
(1967). Aubert studied the effect of the 1948 Norwegian Law of Housemaids on the relationship
between domestic servants and their employers. See id. at 98. The law, enacted to control hours and
otherwise to improve working conditions for servants, did little to change behavior. See id. at 98-99.
In approximately half of the 233 households studied, the ten-hour working day was exceeded. Id.
Only 10% of the sampled relationships showed complete compliance with the law. Id. Aubert
points out that legal regulation was difficult because "[t]he law concern[ed] an area traditionally
assumed to be protected against public inspection and control, the home," and because of the
intimate (family-like) and strong nature of the relationship between servant and master. Id. at 105.
178. See, eg., Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: 4 PreliminaryStudy,
28 Am. Soc. REv. 55, 58-61, 63-64 (1963) (finding that commercial buyers and sellers often operated
according to informal norms, such as standing behind the product or a person's word is a bond, that
went beyond contractual obligations).
179. Relationships that are largely influenced by social norms and not by laws might remain
unaffected when laws change. See Aubert, supra note 177, at 116 (Norwegian housemaid law had
very little effect on working conditions six years after passage).
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Lon Fuller has argued that norms, or "customary law," regulate family
relations more effectively than do formal legal enactments because norms
structure conduct into roles and functions that create stable expecta-

tions. 8 ' Analogous efforts through legal regulation would probably

require an extremely complex set of rules that could be enforced and
monitored only at great cost. Except for defining the outer limits of
acceptable behavior (definitions that also track social norms),"8 ' the law
seldom attempts to regulate relationships, dictate functions, enforce obligations, or resolve conflicts within the intact family."I Extensive manip-

ulation of family interactions not only would incur formidable
enforcement costs but would involve intrusive invasions of family privacy
by the state. The idea of a court directing parents to reallocate their

child care and occupational responsibilities in an intact family has an
Orwellian flavor that would be highly offensive to most people, even

those committed to the social goal of shared gender roles.
C. Divorce and Legal Regulation of Family Roles
The curtain of family privacy is lifted upon divorce. Some judicial
involvement is necessary to supervise the dissolution of the legal relationship and to reallocate the couple's property rights. Legal oversight also
serves to reinforce informal social norms, weakened in the context of

divorce, by directing parents to fulfill their prescribed responsibilities
despite the breakdown of the marriage. Thus, for example, mothers are
legally directed to give fathers the opportunity to continue their relation180. See Fuller, supra note 174, at 212. In contrast to enacted law, customary law is not limited
to requiring or prohibiting specific acts. Id
181. For example, rules prohibiting child abuse define the outer limits of parents' freedom to
discipline their children according to their own normative prescriptions. Fuller comments that the
function of enacted law in regulating relationships in the larger society is to "impose rules that will
serve to set the limits men must observe in their interactions with one another, leaving them free
within those limits to pursue their own goals." Id. at 212-13.
182. For example, sometimes the theoretical duty of husbands to support their wives was not
enforced in ongoing marriages, regardless of how inadequate the husband had been in performing his
duty. See, eg., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953) (holding that wife could not
maintain an action for support absent separation from her husband). In McGuire, the court stated
that "[t]he living standards of a family are a matter of concern to the household, and not for the
courts to determine, even though the husband's attitude toward his wife ... leaves little to be said in
his behalf." Id. at 342.
This is not to say that the law has no effect on relationships in the intact family. Some feminists
have argued that the law's stance toward the family has reinforced male dominance both explicitly
and implicitly. See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497, 1509 & n.53, 1510-12 (1983). The historical treatment of marital
rape, the authority of parents to physically punish children, and the traditional rules regarding
marital domicile are all examples of legal rules that reinforce hierarchal power relationships within
the family, often in a cloak of nonintervention. Cf. id. On the other hand, married women's
property acts in the 19th century increased the economic power of married women vis-a-vis their
husbands, again without direct intervention. Id at 1531-32. Nevertheless, legal directives that
husbands and wives must fill certain roles in the family, with sanctions for noncompliance, are rare.
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ship with their child, while fathers must continue to provide financial
support.1 8 3 Modern custody law, whether inadvertently or purposefully,
assumes a more interventionist stance. It presumes that courts can redesign family relationships and restructure parental roles without regard to
the past practices and preferences of the parents. As I have demonstrated, no conventional custody rule adequately recognizes the limits of
legal intervention in this context, or acknowledges the costly task of
future monitoring and enforcement necessary if the parties do not readily
adjust to their externally defined roles.
Perhaps the legal response is not surprising in a period when no
normative or positive consensus announces how parents should share
responsibility for their children. Lacking such a guide, custody law
presumes that variety among families means that individual families will
adapt to whatever arrangements courts direct. As I have argued, however, the absence of consensus does not mean that parents casually assign
family roles or that the choices are value-neutral. In an era of flux and
controversy about gender norms, each couple's childrearing arrangement
is likely to be a stable reflection of the preferences of the couple, shaped
by a customized formula of values, goals, skills, experience, and other
internal and external constraints.
L

Joint Custody and ParentalRoles

Given the power of traditional gender norms and the limited effectiveness of legal regulation of family relationships, a rule favoring joint
physical custody appears to be an idealistic but ultimately unsuccessful
effort to reform parental roles by fiat. Although in theory joint custody
might seem to be the optimal expression of a societal commitment to
shared parenting, in practice it is likely to succeed mostly in families in
which predivorce roles reflect the patterns of shared responsibility that
joint custody posits. In other families, resistance and disruption are predictable as former spouses deal with one another and their children in
unfamiliar roles, and legal enforcement mechanisms often will be ineffective in promoting compliance with court-defined roles.
The empirical evidence on joint custody described earlier can be
interpreted in this light."8 4 The fact that parents are more likely to agree
183. A modem example of legal reinforcement of informal family norms is the increasing
inclination of courts to order parental support upon divorce for the college education of children
who are no longer minors, even though parents have no legal obligation to provide this type of
support during marriage. The analysis may take into account whether a given parent would have
provided such support in the intact family. See, eg., Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201 (Wash.
1978) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay for children's
education). Such support orders represent legal reinforcement of social norms regarding parental
duty of support that may have eroded because of family dissolution. See id. at 207-08.
184. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (noting the instability of court-ordered joint
custody arrangements).
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to joint custody if fathers have been involved parents"8 5 suggests the link
between predivorce parental roles and postdivorce custody arrangements. So also does the widespread acceptance of joint legal custody by
mothers as well as fathers, and the lukewarm response to joint physical
custody.1 8 6 Moreover, the evidence that many joint custody arrangements actually mirror sole custody and visitation might suggest that
established parenting patterns tend to persist despite legal reordering of
family relationships." 7 Finally, the observed instability of mandatory or
coerced joint custody arrangements may be due, in part, to parental
resistance to new roles. Conflict about commitment, parenting competency, motivation, values, and even style of care and discipline are predictable in this situation.
In sum, although joint custody expresses a societal goal of shared
parental roles better than alternative custody rules, the effort to promote
ideological change in the family by mandate is improvident. Rather than
conforming to legal expectations, the typical family may respond by
either continuing to follow preexisting family norms (and ignoring the
legal directive) or by undermining the arrangement to the child's detriment. In either case, the costs of legal enforcement will be high, and
little progress is likely to be made toward the desired social goal. Those
who argue that a legal preference favoring joint custody will expedite
gender role change focus on the law's expressive function. A joint custody law, however, functions not only symbolically but also coercively to
restructure the delicate and intimate patterns of family relationships. In
this latter function, its operation will be costly and unsatisfactory.
2.

The Approximation Framework and Family Role Change

In an era in which no consensus defines family roles, the approximation framework responds to normative variation among families by recognizing and reinforcing the existing pattern of child care in each family.
Through this approach, custody law subtly encourages desirable reform
without seeking to coercively restructure complex family relationships.
The approximation framework affirms the desirability of shared parental
roles when parents' relationships reveal a history of shared responsibility.
185. See Lowery, supra note 55, at 312.
186. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. Although joint custody laws have been
widely promoted, EMERY, supra note 45, at 129, many fathers might not want new responsibilities or
an expanded parental role. Some advocates for mothers have resisted joint custody laws and oppose
mandatory joint custody orders in part because such arrangements diminish the maternal role. See,
e.g., Schulman and Pitt, supra note 35, at 570-71. Some mothers also resent claims of entitlement by
fathers to participate in their children's lives after divorce in a manner that substantially alters and
expands their involvement in the family. See id. Moreover, mothers might be skeptical about
fathers' competency or commitment to the task of parenting. See supra note 160.
187. See supra notes 67-68 (discussing "drift" toward mother custody even after fathers were
awarded sole or joint physical custody of children).
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Further, by recognizing the role allocation that each couple has adopted,
this framework removes barriers to the evolution of parental roles
erected by legal rules that order exclusive custody in one parent. In practice, such rules often tend to distort and discount the father's family participation by recognizing only the contribution of the primary caretaker.
This distortion has undesirable behavioral effects as well. Parents are
encouraged to adhere to stereotypical gender roles, and fathers are discouraged from making a greater investment in the parent-child relationship. In contrast, the approximation framework signals to parents who
want to escape from the constraints of traditional parental roles that custody law will support their choices. Investment in parenting will be protected upon divorce. This approach will disappoint those who believe
that custody law can serve as an ambitious tool of social reform. The
framework does not seek to reform by promoting conformity in those
families whose values and relationships are more traditional. My contention is that custody law will be ineffective and, indeed, harmful if it
adopts this stance.
This framework offers the best available response to the dilemma of
custody in a society in which each family functions according to an individual formula of values and preferences. If all, or even most, parents
fully shared child care responsibilities, a joint custody rule would reflect
a normative consensus about egalitarian parental roles.188 We are not at
that point. Until we are, custody law can best support the objective of
encouraging shared parenting by signalling that it will be recognized on
divorce, not by attempting to reform families who follow a different normative plan.

188. Under these circumstances and because of its precision, a joint custody preference would
also be the optimal background bargaining rule. See supra Section III.C.2 (discussing the
importance of a precise rule from which parties can bargain).

